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On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the
“Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly
Patent Disclosure Doctrines)
Mark D. Janis*
Patent systems aspire to stimulate technological progress by
eliciting disclosure.1 It is small wonder, then, that a doctrine such as
enablement2— the principal doctrine speaking to the adequacy of a
patentee’s disclosure— appears prominently in the early jurisprudence
of the U.S. patent system3 and its British antecedents.4 It is equally
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. Thanks to Doug Stilwell and
Bob Holub for research assistance.
1. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) (discussing the “incentive to
disclose” theory and other explanatory theories of patent systems). Courts frequently
characterize the patentee’s disclosure as the “consideration” for the patent grant:
[An inventor] may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In
consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent
is granted. An exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him for seventeen years, but, upon
the expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention ensures to the people,
who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit by its use. . . . To this
end the law requires such disclosure to be made in the application for patent that others
skilled in the art may understand the invention and how to put it to use.
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933).
2. The enablement requirement “demands that the patent specification enable ‘those
skilled in the art’ to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue
experimentation.’” National Recovery Technologies, Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166
F.3d 1190, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Under current U.S. law, the enablement doctrine is codified
in 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (1984) which provides that
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id.
3. For example, Justice Story, riding circuit, invoked disclosure requirements in an early
case when he stated:
It is therefore argued, that if the specification be materially defective, or obscurely or
so loosely worded, that a skillful workman in that particular art could not construct the
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unsurprising that enablement is one of the international minimum
standards for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPs”)-compliant patent systems5 and that, with the rise of
machine, it is a good defence against the action, although no intentional deception has
been practiced. And this is beyond all question the doctrine of the common law; and it
is founded in good reason; for the monopoly is granted upon the express condition,
that the party shall make a full and explicit disclosure, so as to enable the public, at the
expiration of his patent, to make and use the invention or improvement in as ample and
beneficial a manner as the patentee himself. If therefore it be so obscure, loose, and
imperfect, that this cannot be done, it is defrauding the public of all the consideration,
upon which the monopoly is granted.
Bull. N. P. 77; Turner v. Winter, 1 Term R. 602. The motive of the party, whether innocent or
otherwise, becomes immaterial because the public mischief remains the same. Whittemore v.
Cutter, 29 F.Cas. 1120, 1122 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
4. For example, Mr. Justice Buller, speaking in The King v. Arkwright, Dav. Pat. Cas.
106 (1785), traced the adequacy of disclosure requirement back to the Statute of Monopolies:
If the specification be such that mechanical men of common understanding can
comprehend it, to make a machine by it, it is sufficient; but then it must be such that
persons skilled in the art or science to which the invention relates may be able to make
the machine by following the directions of the specification, without making any
experiments, and without any new invention or addition of their own.
See generally WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS, 284 n.62 (1837)
(citing Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Bl. 463, 484 (1795)). Indeed, nineteenth century commentary on
the origins of the specification invoke both the disclosure requirement and the consideration
rationale. According to one early commentator on British patent law, the requirement for a
specification grew out of the practice of including a short description of the invention in a
patent, as well as an indication that the patentee would later include a particular description of
the invention in the Chancery. W.M. HINDMARCH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENT
PRIVILEGES FOR TO THE SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS 151 (1846). Hindmarch reported that:
Specifications were unknown until the reign of Queen Anne; but before that time, it
was usual in a patent . . . to insert a recital containing a description of the invention
which was made the subject of the grant. And there can be little doubt that a patent
without such a recital, and also without a condition requiring a specification or
description of the invention in some way or other for the use of the public, would be
absolutely void for want of consideration.
Id.
5. Article 29(1) of the TRIPs component of the GATT agreement provides that:
“Members shall require that an applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art
. . . .” For the full text of the TRIPs component, see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) (Annex 1C: Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights).
The preeminence of enablement has been plainly apparent in recent international
negotiations. For example, Article 3(1) of the proposed Patent Law Treaty would have
incorporated an enablement standard: “The application shall disclose the invention in a manner
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modern patent claiming practices and the contemporary obsession
with patent claim scope, courts have insisted on correlating the scope
of the enabling disclosure with the scope of the claims.6
Notwithstanding the historical and conceptual primacy of
disclosure and the likelihood that enablement and other disclosure
doctrines will bear increasing stress in modern patent disputes,7
neither courts nor commentators have ever satisfactorily mapped the
full contours of the enablement requirement much less the other
extant disclosure requirements. The enablement standard has
exhibited markedly little evolution since the days of Justice Story.
Instead, the law of adequate patent disclosure in the U.S. and abroad,
viewed as a collective body, has been marked by the periodic
emergence and proliferation of a multiplicity of specialized doctrines,
each purportedly offering tailored responses to perceived individual
disclosure deficiencies.
The task of coordinating these doctrines to achieve even modest
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.”
Draft Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as
Far as Patents Are Concerned (Patent Law Treaty), WIPO Doc. PLT/DC3 (Dec. 21, 1990),
reprinted in Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty
Supplementing the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as Far as Patents
Are Concerned, WIPO Diplomatic Conference, pt. 1, 11-53 (1991), and in Symposium, The
Harmonization of International Patent Law, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 669-703 (1993). See
also HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT HARMONIZATION 156 (§ 1445) (1993) (noting that Article
3(1) corresponds to the U.S. enablement requirement.).
6. For example, the Federal Circuit recently summarized the nature and purpose of the
enablement requirement as follows:
The enablement requirement of § 112 demands that the patent specification enable
“those skilled in the art to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention
without ‘undue experimentation.’ . . . The enablement requirement ensures that the
public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least
commensurate with the scope of the claims. The scope of the claims must be less than
or equal to the scope of the enablement. The scope of enablement, in turn, is that
which is disclosed in the specification plus the scope of what would be known to one
of ordinary skill in the art without undue experimentation.
National Recovery Technologies, 166 F.3d at 1195-96 (citations omitted).
7. One reason to expect disclosure doctrines to become more significant is that subject
matter eligibility doctrines are rapidly becoming insignificant. See, e.g., State Street Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (culmination of a
long process of erosion of subject matter eligibility obstacles to software patent claims); see
also Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 2000 WL 37063 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(confirming utility patent eligibility for genetically-enhanced seeds notwithstanding the
availability of protection under the Plant Variety Protection Act).
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coherence has long been recognized as both formidable and vexing.
Willard Phillips, in his 1837 treatise on U.S. patent law, observed of
the “requisites of the specification”:8
These requisites, it is apparent, are blended and intermixed
. . . . [They] run so much into each other, in their nature and
character, and again are found to be so frequently blended
together in the same case, and in the same sentence, that it is
difficult to treat of them separately, and yet there is so much
variety and diversity among them, that they cannot be treated
of together indiscriminately, without confusion.9
This state of confusion apparently continued to characterize the
disclosure requirements decades later.10 Yet even to the present day,
the subject has received scant judicial attention.
This Article explores the problem of incoherence among modern
disclosure doctrines.11 Specifically, it examines the extent to which
the Federal Circuit’s unfortunate new dalliance with the “written
description” requirement has frustrated coherence both among other
disclosure doctrines and in patent law’s doctrinal architecture
8. Section 3 of the 1793 Act governed adequacy of disclosure at the time. Section 3
provided that:
Every inventor, before he can receive a patent, shall deliver a written description of his
invention, and of the manner of using, or process of compounding the same, in such
full, clear, and exact terms, as to distinguish it from all other things before known, and
to enable any person, skilled in the art or science, of which it is a branch, of with
which it is most nearly connected, to make, compound, and use the same. And in case
of any machine, he shall fully explain the principle, and the several modes in which he
has contemplated the application of the principle or character, by which it may be
distinguished from other inventions.
See DONALD S. CHISUM, 6 ON PATENTS App. 10 (1999) (full text of the 1793 Act).
9. PHILLIPS, supra note 5, at 237.
10. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 256 (4th
ed. 1873).
11. Under current U.S. law three disclosure doctrines are presently recognized as
emanating from the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112— enablement, written description, and
best mode. See, e.g., Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (referring to separate enablement, written description, and best mode
requirements). The utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 presumably would qualify as an
additional disclosure requirement. See, e.g., Process Control Corp. v. Hydreclaim Corp., 190
F.3d 1350, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (elaborating on the § 101 utility requirement and its
relationship with the “how-to-use” prong of the § 112 enablement requirement).
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generally.
The written description requirement purports to measure whether
the written description in a patent disclosure “reasonably convey[s] to
one of skill in the art that the inventor possessed” the claimed subject
matter.12 Criticized for its “threadbare origins”13 and “mysterious”
birth,14 the written description requirement originated in a 1967 Court
of Customs and Tax Appeals (“C.C.P.A.”) decision, In re Ruschig.15
The decision involved a patent application that disclosed various
reagents and general instructions for preparing classes of chemical
compounds but claimed a single chemical species, via a claim added
after the filing date.16 Analogizing the generic disclosure to a forest
and the claimed species to a tree, Judge Rich, for the court, concocted
an earthy metaphor to explain why he was invalidating the genus
claim:
It is an old custom in the woods to mark trails by making blaze
marks on the trees. It is no help in finding a trail . . . to be
confronted simply by a large number of unmarked trees.
Appellants are pointing to trees. We are looking for blaze
marks which single out particular trees. We see none.17
The C.C.P.A. gradually came to employ the written description
requirement in three contexts: (1) where claims were amended or
newly-added after the filing in a regular ex parte prosecution, raising
an issue as to whether the claims were entitled to the application’s
filing date; (2) where the patentee asserted that claims in a later
application were entitled to the benefit of the filing date of an earlier
application under § 120; and (3) where a party asserted that counts in
12. See, e.g., Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
13. Laurence H. Pretty, The Recline and Fall of Mechanical Genus Claim Scope Under
“Written Description” in the Sofa Case, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 469, 471
(1998).
14. Kevin S. Rhoades, The Section 112 “Description Requirement”— A Misbegotten
Provision Confirmed, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 869, 902 (1992).
15. In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967). Efforts to trace the requirement back
further are unpersuasive. See infra Part I.
16. Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 991, 993-95 (describing the contents of the disclosure and setting
forth claim 13, the claim at issue).
17. Id. at 994-95. In view of the chaotic nature of the doctrine that Ruschig has launched,
perhaps it is appropriate that Ruschig is also the case in which Judge Rich observed memorably
that “[t]he life of a patent solicitor has always been a hard one.” Id. at 993.
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an interference were supported in a specification.18 Nearly all of these
cases involved the chemical arts.
Today, however, the written description requirement enjoys a
prominence wholly out of proportion to its humble origins. It is now
invoked not only in its three traditional venues19 but also against
claims that were originally filed as part of the written description.20 It
has now been applied with unaccustomed vigor to cases in the
“predictable” arts.21 The United States Patent and Trademark Office
18. See, e.g., In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (citing C.C.P.A. authority
for each context). Similarly, In re Bowen, 472 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A. 1974), describes “two
functions” of the written description requirement: first, “[i]n the simple case, where no prior
application is relied upon, the description requirement is that the invention claimed be described
in the specification as filed.” Id. at 864. Second, “where the benefit of a prior application is
being claimed under 35 U.S.C. § 120, the description requirement comes into play as mandating
a description of the invention, which is claimed in the later- filed case, in the specification of
the application relied upon for support under the statute.” Id. at 864.
Notably, early cases did not contemplate applying the written description requirement to
cases in which the claims were originally filed with the written description at issue. See, e.g.,
Smith, 481 F.2d at 914 (“Where the claim is an original claim, the underlying concept of
insuring disclosure as of the filing date is satisfied, and the description requirement has likewise
been held to be satisfied.”) (citing C.C.P.A. authority).
19. See, e.g., In re Wright, 866 F.2d 422 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (considering allegation that
claims added during prosecution did not enjoy written description support); Tronzo, 156 F.3d at
1158 (considering allegation that claims entitled to the benefit of an earlier filing date under
§ 120 did not enjoy written description support in the earlier-filed application); Hyatt v. Boone,
146 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (considering allegation that an interference count entitled to the
filing date of a party’s specification did not enjoy written description support in that
specification).
20. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Commentators have been quick to attack the use of the written description requirement in this
context. See Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description
Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 615 (1998); Harris A.
Pitlick, The Mutation on the Description Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. TM. OFF. SOC’Y 209,
222 (1998) (characterizing the Lilly decision as an “unmitigated disaster that if followed, has
the potential for causing untold havoc in the biotechnology field”).
21. See, e.g., Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The
extension of the written description requirement from the “unpredictable” to the predictable arts
is the focus of one commentator’s recent criticism. See also Pretty, supra note 13, at 476-77.
For cases discussing the distinction between predictable and unpredictable arts, see, e.g., In re
Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Where, as here, a claimed genus represents a
diverse and relatively poorly understood group of microorganisms, the required level of
disclosure will be greater than, for example, the disclosure of an invention involving a
“predictable” factor such as a mechanical or electrical element.”); Spectra-Physics, Inc. v.
Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 n.5 (Fed. Cir.1987) (“If an invention pertains to an art
where the results are predictable, e.g. mechanical as opposed to chemical arts, a broad claim can
be enabled by disclosure of a single embodiment.”); In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (CCPA
1970) (expressing a similar distinction).
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(“PTO”), currently in the process of crafting examiner guidelines for
application of the written description requirement, has taken pains to
write the guidelines “in a technology neutral manner which is broadly
applicable to all areas of technology and to all types of claims
(original, new, or amended, and product, process, or
product-by-process).”22
Part I of this Article argues that the distinction between the written
description and enablement requirements is artificial.23 Part II argues
that by perpetuating this artificial distinction, the Federal Circuit has
impaired the development of a coherent vision of the requirements
for adequate disclosure.24 Specifically, by devising an essentially
standardless disclosure doctrine that can be deployed arbitrarily, the
Federal Circuit has effectively arrogated to itself unbridled authority
to strike down claims for inadequate disclosure.
Part III places the problem in comparative perspective, analyzing
the jurisprudence of the European Patent Office and the British
system for evidence of the same phenomenon, whereby decision
makers reach beyond enablement for ill-defined, ancillary disclosure
22. Revised Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35
U.S.C. § 112, para. 1, 64 Fed. Reg. 71427, 71428 (1999) [hereinafter Revised PTO Guidelines].
Id. at 71428. The previous iteration of the guidelines included examples devoted exclusively to
application of the written description requirement to biotechnology cases, but the PTO decided
to omit those examples from the revised guidelines. Id. (listed under the heading “Overview of
Comments”).
23. This Part seeks to get beyond the issue of whether § 112 is properly construed to
impose a separate written description requirement, instead addressing the historical rationale
and policies that have been offered in support of the distinction. The statutory construction issue
is, in any event, largely intractable. For opposing views on the proper construction of § 112,
para. 1, see, e.g., In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 591-92 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (arguing that the language
“written description” is rendered superfluous if § 112, para. 1 is construed to impose only an
enablement requirement); cf. Barker, 559 F.2d at 594-95 (Markey, J., dissenting) (attacking the
majority’s analysis). See also Rhoades, supra note 14, at 870-73 (arguing that under a proper
statutory construction, no separate written description requirement would be recognized).
24. By coherence I mean to refer to a relationship going beyond strict logical
consistency— a matter of “consistency plus.” See, e.g., William A. Edmundson, The Antinomy
of Coherence and Determinacy, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2 (1996); Kenneth J. Kress, Legal
Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear
Order of Decisions, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 369, 370 (1984) (describing coherence as occupying a
middle ground between logical consistency and logical entailment). See also Kenneth J. Kress,
Coherence, BLACKWELL COMPANIONS TO PHILOSOPHY: A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 535, 542 (Dennis Patterson, ed. 1996). “Partitioning” between
doctrines, policies, or principles can be antithetical to coherence. See generally Edmundson, 81
IOWA L. REV. at 15-17.
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doctrines. This Part argues that both the European notion of article 84
“support” and the British notion of “fair basis” illustrate the same
unfortunate tendencies of the United States written description
requirement. Finally, Part IV concludes with a brief analysis of why
written description or analogous doctrines seem to proliferate
spontaneously on the landscape of patent disclosure requirements,
concluding that the fault lies in courts’ hesitancy to explore the power
of the enablement requirement.
I.
Today, the Federal Circuit treats the existence of the written
description requirement as a fait accompli. Rarely does the Federal
Circuit pause to explain the supposed benefits of maintaining
separate enablement and written description requirements,25
apparently taking the view that at this stage, such explanations would
only benefit the “uninitiated.”26
This substantial block of case law lends the written description
requirement a certain superficial pedigree; but it should not mask the
fact that neither the Federal Circuit nor the C.C.P.A. has ever
articulated a persuasive rationale for distinguishing the written
25. See, e.g., In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reciting without
explanation that the “adequate written description requirement . . . is distinct from the
enablement and best mode requirements”); In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(citing C.C.P.A. authority: “The description requirement is found in 35 U.S.C. § 112 and is
separate from the enablement requirement of that provision.”). See also Eiselstein v. Frank,
52 F.3d 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (applying a separate written description requirement without
reference to the possibility of overlap with the enablement requirement); Wang Laboratories,
Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Hayes Microcomputer Products, Inc.
Patent Litigation, 982 F.2d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
This tradition of written description requirement ipse dixit was handed down from the
Federal Circuit’s predecessor court. See, e.g., Barker, 559 F.2d at 591 (“This court has clearly
recognized that there is a description of the invention requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, separate and distinct from the enablement requirement.”); In re Bowen, 492 F.2d at
864 (“The so-called ‘description requirement’ . . . exists in the first paragraph independent of
the enablement (how to make and how to use) portions . . . .”); Smith, 481 F.2d at 914 (“This
court has repeatedly recognized a separate description requirement in the first paragraph of
§ 112.”). For a review of C.C.P.A. precedent on the written description requirement, see
Rhoades, supra note 14, at 873-84.
26. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“To the
uninitiated, it may seem anomalous that the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 has been
interpreted as requiring a separate ‘description of the invention’ . . . .”).
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description requirement from the enablement requirement. On the
rare instances when the courts have attempted to justify the
distinction, the justifications— whether based on historical, political,
or other theory— have proven singularly disappointing.
Perhaps the most dubious of these theories is the historical
rationale.27 The historical rationale for the written description
requirement derives from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a
predecessor to § 112 in Evans v. Eaton.28 In Evans the Supreme
Court declared that a patent specification must function not only to
enable “artizans” to make and use the claimed invention but also “to
put the public in possession of what the party claims as his own
invention.”29 This superficially appealing historical basis for a written
description requirement distinct from enablement cannot withstand
scrutiny, however.30 Evans was decided at a time when United States
patents were not required to contain claims.31 Consequently, the
27. The C.C.P.A. attempted to justify the written description requirement on the basis of
an historical rationale in Barker, 559 F.2d at 591-93. Later, the Federal Circuit resorted to a
similar historical rationale in Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1560-61. It is particularly curious that
Judge Rich invoked history in Vas-Cath given that he seemed disinclined to accept any such
rationale in his own concurring opinion in Barker:
The basic problem here is simple . . . and there is no need to justify it by extensive
review of the evolution since 1790 of the language of § 112, first paragraph.
Considering the evolutionary history of the language of § 112, I do not subscribe to its
interpretation through assumptions based on presumptions about usage of superfluous
words and the like.
 Barker, 559 F.2d at 594 (Rich, J., concurring). See also id. at 594 (Markey, J., dissenting)
(“The attempt to create historical and current statutory support for a ‘separate description’
requirement, which was solely a judicial (and unnecessary) response to chemical cases in which
appellants were arguing that those skilled in the art ‘might’ make and use a claimed invention,
is mistaken.”).
28. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
29. Id. at 433-34, 95 quoted in Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561.
30. Mueller, supra note 20, at 619-20.
31. Both Barker and Vas-Cath acknowledge as much, but in neither case does the court
seem to grasp the significance of this fact. See Barker, 559 F.2d at 592, n.4 (noting
parenthetically that “[t]he 1793 Act did not require claims”); Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561 (“The
patent laws then in effect, namely the Patent Act of 1793, did not require claims . . . .”). Barker
appears to imply that contemporary secondary authorities would have supported the notion of a
separate written description requirement, citing, for example, the following passage from
Professor Robinson’s treatise:
According to the statutes, the Description must contain full explanations of three
different subjects: the invention itself; the manner of making it; and the mode of
putting it to practical use— a complete knowledge upon all these points being
Washington University Open Scholarship
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patentee’s description needed not only to enable practice of the
invention, but also to put the public on notice as to what the patentee
considered to be the protected invention. Read in context the
“possession” language of Evans clearly is directed towards satisfying
this notice function, one which the modern written description does
not require.32
While history does not provide compelling justification for the
written description requirement, history may provide some insights
into current attitudes that are manifested in applications of the
requirement. For example, the evolution of the written description
requirement is intertwined with the development of the new matter
prohibition currently codified in § 132.33 Some C.C.P.A. cases
subsequent to Ruschig seem to treat the new matter prohibition and
the written description requirement interchangeably.34 Today, the law
has definitively moved away from this position. Amendments to the
specification may raise a § 132 new matter issue, while amendments
to the claims may raise a § 112 written description issue.35
necessary to render the invention available to the public without further experiment or
exercise of inventive skill.
Barker, 559 F.2d at 593 n.5, citing W. ROBINSON, 2 THE LAW OF PATENTS 73 (1890). This
passage plainly does not support a separate written description requirement as applied in
modern patent law. Instead, it merely calls upon the specification to describe what is necessary
to enable, to “render the invention available to the public without further experiment . ..”
32. Specifically, the relevant passage from Evans highlights that the specification must:
put the public in possession of what the party claims as his own invention, so as to
ascertain if he claims anything that is in common use, or is already known, and to
guard against prejudice or injury from the use of an invention which the party may
otherwise innocently suppose not to be patented. It is, therefore, for the purpose of
warning an innocent purchaser or other person using a machine of his infringement of
the patent; and at the same time of taking from the inventor the means of practising
upon the credulity or the fears of other persons, by pretending that his invention is
more than what it really is, or different from its ostensible objects, that the patentee is
required to distinguish his invention in his specification.
 Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 434, quoted in Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561.
33. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1994) (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the
disclosure of the invention.”).
34. Perhaps most notable is Judge Rich’s concurring opinion in Barker. Judge Rich at this
stage seemed more inclined towards the new matter criterion than the description requirement:
“The basic problem here is simple: new matter, in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 132, was inserted by
amendment and the claim contains that new matter. It thus lacks support and must be rejected.
Barker, 559 F.2d at 594 (Rich, J., concurring).
35. Judge Markey explained the distinction:
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Nevertheless, the suspicion that attends new matter issues is certainly
detectable in modern written description cases.36
Certain rules that developed in connection with reissue practice
also provide an historical analogy of interest, though not a historical
justification. In U.S. Industrial Chemicals, Inc., the Supreme Court
interpreted the then-governing reissue provision37 to require objective
intent, manifested in the original patent, to claim the invention later
claimed in the reissue patent.38 Federal Circuit law interpreting the
current reissue provision39 firmly rejects the “objective intent to
Broadening a claim does not add new matter to the disclosure. Disclosure is that which
is taught, not that which is claimed . . .. The proper basis for rejection of a claim
amended to recite elements thought to be without support in the original disclosure,
therefore, is § 112, first paragraph, not § 132. The latter section prohibits addition of
new matter to the original disclosure. It is properly employed as a basis for objection
to amendments to the abstract, specifications, or drawings attempting to add new
disclosure to that originally presented. Past opinions of this court, in cases in which a
§ 132 claim rejection was reviewed on a § 112 analysis, should not in future be viewed
as having approved the employment of § 132 as a basis for claim rejection. The
amended claims involved in those cases should have been rejected under § 112, first
paragraph. The claim rejections in those cases could then have been explicitly affirmed
or reversed on direct applications of § 112, rather than on § 112 analyses applied to
§ 132 rejections. Accordingly, such cases are overruled insofar as they approved
rejection of claims under § 132.
In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1214-15 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (footnotes omitted).
36. Similar attitudes may have been brought to bear in judicial interpretations of the well-
known Muncie Gear case. In Muncie Gear Works, Inc. v. Outboard, Marine & Mfg., 315 U.S.
759 (1942), the claimed invention was placed on sale in January or February, 1926. Id. at 764.
The application was filed on August 25, 1926, well within the two-year time period allowed by
the then-governing predecessor to 102(b). Id. at 766 (citing R.S. 4886). The claims at issue,
along with additional disclosure, were added to the application on March 30, 1929, i.e., more
than two years after the sale. Id. at 762-63. According to the Federal Circuit and the C.C.P.A.,
the matter added to the written description would have violated the new matter prohibition as
understood today; the claims, accordingly, were not entitled to the August 25, 1926 filing date.
The case is merely a garden-variety example of a new matter violation. See, e.g., Correge v.
Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Westphal v. Fawzi, 666 F.2d 575, 576-77
(C.C.P.A. 1981). However, in Kahn v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 508 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1974),
the court assumed that Muncie Gear had created a rule of late claiming. Id. at 943. While
modern written description cases cannot correctly be characterized as pure late claiming cases,
the hostility toward amended or newly-added claims certainly is evident.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 64 (1964) (requiring that the reissue patent be “for the same invention” as
the original patent).
38. Id. at 1413. U.S. Indus. Chemicals, Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., 315
U.S. 668, 676 (1942).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (requiring that the reissue patent be for “the invention disclosed in the
original patent”).
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claim” test and instead inquires “whether one skilled in the art,
reading the specification, would identify the subject matter of the
new claims as invented and disclosed by the patentees,”40 an inquiry
that the Federal Circuit characterizes as being “analogous to the
‘written description’ requirement.”41 Nevertheless, some modern
written description cases seem to express an intent-to-claim rule.42
For example, the court’s rhetoric in Wright, attempting to capture the
“essence” of the written description requirement, had intent-to-claim
overtones:
When the scope of a claim has been changed by amendment in
such a way as to justify an assertion that it is directed to a
different invention than was the original claim, it is proper to
inquire whether the newly claimed subject matter was
described in the patent application when filed as the invention
of the applicant. That is the essence of the so-called
“description requirement” of § 112, first paragraph.43
The U.S. Industrial Chemicals decision even found its way into a
recent high-profile written description decision.44
In addition to invoking history, courts invoke an intuitive logic to
justify the written description requirement, with alarming results.
Judge Rich attempted such a justification in a non-precedential
opinion, In re Hunter.45 According to Judge Rich:
Although a specification that meets the written description
requirement always satisfies the enablement requirement, the
converse is not always true. The written description must
“enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use” the
claimed invention. A patent specification, however, may
fortuitously enable those of skill in the art to make and use an
40. In re Amos, 953 F.2d 613, 618 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also Hester Indus., Inc. v. Stein,
Inc., 142 F.3d 1472, 1484-85 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
41. Hester, 142 F.3d at 1484.
42. The Gentry Gallery essential element formulation may be an example. See infra notes
81-91 and accompanying text.
43. Wright, 866 F.2d at 424.
44. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Reiffin decision).
45. 59 F.3d 181, (table); 1995 WL 364375 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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invention that an applicant did not make before filing the
patent application. This latter application would satisfy the
enablement requirement, but would not provide a section 112,
first paragraph, “written description” adequate to support
claims directed toward the later-made invention.46
Judge Rich’s analysis is revealing, particularly in its startling
reference to “fortuitous” enablement. He apparently calls for judges
to distinguish between those inventors who deliberately provided
instruction about how to make and use their inventions, and those
who “got lucky.” But even this formulation masks the true inquiry,
because there is no authority for penalizing inventors who fail to
disclose the underlying scientific principles of their inventions.47
Instead, it seems Judge Rich opens the door for courts to strike down
claims that are later revealed to encompass numerous embodiments
and exceed what is expressly disclosed. This is true even where the
evidence shows that persons of ordinary skill in the art could interpret
the embodiments without undue experimentation.48
Similar objections might be raised to the C.C.P.A.’s attempt to
illustrate the difference between enablement and written description
through a simplified example:
[C]onsider the case where the specification discusses only
compound A and contains no broadening language of any kind.
This might very well enable one skilled in the art to make and
use compounds B and C; yet the class consisting of A, B and C
has not been described.49
This illustration does not justify a separate written description
requirement. The illustration is contrived; it seems highly improbable
that enablement would be satisfied given the condition that the
applicant’s disclosure “contains no broadening language”—
46. 1995 WL 36475 at **5 (citations omitted).
47. See, e.g., Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (declaring that “it
is not a requirement of patentability that an inventor correctly set forth, or even know, how or
why the invention works.”); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is axiomatic that an inventor need not comprehend the scientific principles on
which the practical effectiveness of his invention rests.”).
48. See infra Part II.
49. In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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apparently meaning it contains no express “broadening” language.
However, if the genus is small or the technology mundane, those of
ordinary skill in the art might employ the applicant’s express
instruction to make and use compounds B and C without undue
experimentation. These very conditions— small genus, mundane
technology— seem equally applicable to the conclusion that an
express description of A would be deemed an implicit description of
the entire class. Indeed, a contrary conclusion requires a powerful
justification that the example fails to provide. Even if the inventor
was cognizant of the full breadth of his claim as of the application
filing date, what justifies penalizing the inventor if the extent of his
teaching reached to compounds B and C?50
In addition to invoking history and logic, courts have attempted to
justify the written description requirement on policy grounds. In
general, these arguments are feeble.51 For example, in Smith the court
states that the “essential goal” of the written description requirement
is to substantiate the evidence of completion of the act of invention:
Satisfaction of the description requirement insures that subject
matter presented in the form of a claim subsequent to the filing
date of the application was sufficiently disclosed at the time of
filing so that the prima facie date of invention can fairly be
held to be the filing date of the application.52
This statement is an important summary of judicial attitudes about the
written description requirement as a safety valve that supplements
enablement.53 However, it assumes that enablement needs
50. Others have criticized this example. See, e.g., Rhoades, supra note 14, at 899-900.
51. This is particularly the case in the Federal Circuit era. For example, Vas-Cath purports
to offer a policy-based rationale for the written description requirement, but the analysis simply
rehashes C.C.P.A. precedent. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561-63.
52. See, e.g., Smith, 481 F.2d at 914 (noting in relation that the written description
requirement seeks to ensure that the specification as originally filed “convey[s] clearly to those
skilled in the art the information that the applicant has invented the specific subject matter later
claimed.”). See also Rhoades, supra note 14, at 895 (identifying the passage in Smith as
“probably the most perspicuous statement” of the purpose of the written description
requirement and proceeding to conclude that in view of the stated purpose the written
description requirement is redundant of the enablement requirement).
53. As Professor Mueller quite aptly states, written description has become “an effective
‘super enablement’ standard of uncertain scope and applicability.” See Mueller, supra note 20,
at 617.
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supplementing— that a fully enabling description might nonetheless
be insufficient to justify a constructive reduction to practice.54
Proponents of the written description requirement have yet to explain
exactly what benefits the requirement provides that are not already
provided by the enablement requirement.
II.
The previous Part argued that no compelling reason to recognize a
distinct written description requirement exists. This Part argues that
maintaining the fiction of a distinction between the written
description requirement and the enablement requirement imposes
substantial costs. Patentees pay for the uncertainties of the written
description requirement in terms of potential erosion to the value of
the patent right.55 The patent system will never be free of uncertainty
costs, but, as this Part seeks to demonstrate, they are especially
egregious in connection with the written description requirement.
Neither the PTO nor the Federal Circuit has managed to codify the
inherent uncertainties of the requirement within any workable
standard. This Part concludes by considering the way in which the
written description requirement imposes costs by impairing
54. One scholar who is otherwise critical of the application of the written description
requirement seems to accept the proposition that the requirement is necessary to substantiate the
prima facie invention date and thus prevent inventors from capturing a “windfall vis-á-vis the
prior art.” [sic] Mueller, supra note 20, at 622 (arguing that “[a]bsent written description
scrutiny, a later-presented claim not truly entitled to the earlier filing date of the application
would be improperly examined against a smaller universe of prior art than is legally available”).
However, the later-filed claim would have to be supported by an enabling disclosure in order to
be entitled to the benefit of the application filing date. Thus, it is not clear why the written
description requirement is strictly needed in this scenario, even though courts are accustomed to
using it.
55. The Federal Circuit has even been known to confound itself as to the nature of the
written description requirement. Compare Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l, Inc., 835 F.2d
1419, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The purpose of the description requirement . . . is to state what is
needed to fulfill the enablement criteria. These requirements may be viewed separately, but they
are intertwined.”) with Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563 (“To the extent that Kennecott conflicts with
[a prior Federal Circuit decision] we note that decisions of a three-judge panel of this court
cannot overturn prior precedential decisions . . . [W]e hereby reaffirm, that 35 U.S.C. § 112,
first paragraph, requires a ‘written description of the invention’ which is separate and distinct
from the enablement requirement.”). Previously, Judge Rich had insisted on the one hand that
enablement and written description were distinct while admitting that the two requirements
were “commingled.” Barker, 559 F.2d at 594 (Rich, J., concurring).
Washington University Open Scholarship
210.doc 08/24/00
70 Re-Engineering Patent Law [Vol. 2:55
coherence among disclosure doctrines.
A. Grasping for “Possession”: The PTO Guidelines
Recent efforts to elaborate the “possession” standard both confirm
the substantial redundancy of the enablement and written description
requirements and illustrate the capacity of the written description
requirement to serve as a tool for judicial improvisation. This subpart
considers recent PTO efforts to flesh out “possession” and then
addresses Federal Circuit efforts, especially those focusing on the
“essential element” gloss.
The PTO took up the task of refining the possession standard in
the latest iteration of the PTO written description requirement
guidelines.56 The Revised PTO Guidelines contemplate two basic
routes toward satisfaction of the possession standard: first, by
describing an actual reduction to practice of the claimed invention;57
and, second, “by showing that the invention was ‘ready for patenting’
such as by the disclosure of drawings or other descriptions of the
invention that are sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in
the art to practice the invention.” Employing these basic notions, the
Revised PTO Guidelines attempt to provide guidance for testing
written description compliance of originally filed claims as well as
new or amended claims.58 For example, in considering written
description compliance of an originally filed claim drawn “to a single
embodiment or species,” the disclosure must either “describe” an
56. See supra note 22.
57. Revised PTO Guidelines, supra note 22, at 71434 (citing Pfaff v. Wells Electronics,
Inc., 119 S. Ct. 304, 312 (1998)). The PTO’s incorporation of the Pfaff standard is of interest
because it probably represents an extension of current Federal Circuit law, whereas in other
respects the PTO insists that it is merely implementing existing Federal Circuit law in the
guidelines.
58. The Revised PTO Guidelines send a mixed message as to how frequently written
description support will be at issue in cases involving originally-filed claims. On the one hand,
the Revised PTO Guidelines announce that there is a “strong presumption” of satisfaction of the
written description requirement where the claims at issue were originally filed in the
application. Revised PTO Guidelines, supra note 22, at 71435 (citation omitted) (predicting that
“rejection of an original claim for lack of written description should be rare.”). On the other
hand, the Revised Guidelines set forth an elaborate set of rules for assessing written description
compliance for originally-filed claims, but only deal perfunctorily with rules for assessing
compliance with new or amended claims.
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actual reduction to practice, include drawings depicting in
“sufficient” detail the “new or not conventional” features of the
invention, or disclose “sufficiently detailed relevant identifying
characteristics” of the invention.59 The same rules apply for claims
drawn “to a genus” except that the description of the actual reduction
to practice need only be a description of a “representative number of
species.”60 By contrast, for new or amended claims, or claims seeking
the benefit of an earlier priority date or filing date, the Revised PTO
Guidelines offer only perfunctory guidance, demanding simply that
“each claim limitation must be expressly, implicitly, or inherently
supported in the originally filed disclosure.”61
While the PTO deserves kudos for its admirable effort to create
something from nothing, the Guidelines do little to bring the written
description requirement out from under the shadow of enablement.
For example, assessing “possession” by way of the Pfaff standard
appears to call explicitly for an enablement analysis. Assessing
possession, by analyzing the description of an actual reduction to
practice, simply raises an additional question as to the quality of the
increment of additional disclosure, beyond enabling disclosure, that is
required of a patent applicant in order to avoid a written description
problem.62 Moreover, it simply restates the standard to say, for
example, that possession is shown by drawings that disclose
“sufficient detail” or written disclosure revealing “sufficiently
detailed relevant identifying characteristics.”63
B. In Search of the Essential: Gentry Gallery and Progeny
Notwithstanding critical commentary on the shortcomings of the
possession standard, the Federal Circuit has been enamored with the
59. Revised PTO Guidelines, supra note 22, at 71435.
60. Presumably, most claims would fall into this category. Id. at 71436.
61. Id.
62. The circularity problem is particularly evident in regards to the requirement of
disclosure of a “representative” number of species in order to provide an adequate written
description of a genus claim. The Guidelines define “representative species” to mean that “the
species which are adequately described are representative of the entire genus.” Id..
63. Id. The same criticism could be directed to the use of the “support” rubric in the rules
for new and amended claims.
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possession test practically since the court’s inception.64 Although  the
Federal Circuit nibbles around the edges of the standard, it has rarely,
if ever, succeeded in giving the standard any real content.65
In Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., the Federal Circuit
asserted that a description that merely renders a claimed invention
obvious does not satisfy the possession test.66 On the other hand,
“ipsis verbis disclosure is not necessary to satisfy the written
description requirement.”67 In Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, the court
attempted to identify the middle ground by dusting off the “blaze
marks” metaphor from Ruschig:68
64. See Harris A. Pitlick, Looking Beyond Blazemarks on Trees— It’s Time to Revisit the
Description Requirement in the Wake of Warner-Jenkinson, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 625, 635 (1997) (arguing that the possession test is especially difficult to apply to claims
that have been narrowed during prosecution). Pitlick does not go so far as to repudiate the
possession test, instead advancing an incentive test that is designed to serve as an “adjunct” to
the possession test. Id. at 640. See, e.g., Rhoades, supra note 14, at 893-94 (criticizing the
possession test as too subjective). See also In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(endorsing the possession test).
65. To be sure, in Fiers v. Ravel, the Federal Circuit did attempt to give the possession
standard some degree of independent significance, but only in the specialized context of DNA
inventions. The court emphasized that possession requires a degree of specificity:
An adequate written description of a DNA requires more than a mere statement that it
is part of the invention and reference to a potential method for isolating it; what is
required is a description of the DNA itself . . . . A bare reference to a DNA with a
statement that it can be obtained by reverse transcription is not a description; it does
not indicate that Revel was in possession of the DNA. . . . As we stated in Amgen . . .
such a disclosure just represents a wish, or arguably a plan, for obtaining the DNA . . .
one cannot describe what one has not conceived.
984 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Tellingly, however, the court relied heavily upon
Amgen, an enablement case, as its principal authority. Id. at 1171 (referring to Amgen Inc. v.
Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
66. Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“One
shows that one is in ‘possession’ of the invention by describing the invention, with all its
claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious.”) (emphasis in original). The embedded
reference to “describing” makes the definition circular in any event.
The Lilly court added a corollary: “[A] fortiori, a description that does not render a claimed
invention obvious does not sufficiently describe that invention for purposes of § 112, para. 1.”
Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1567 (emphasis in original).
67. Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also Alton, 76 F.3d
at 1175 (“If a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the inventor to have
been in possession of the claimed invention at the time of filing, even if every nuance of the
claims is not explicitly described in the specification, then the adequate written description
requirement is met.”).
68. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Were we to extend Ruschig ‘s metaphor to this case, we would
say that it is easy to bypass a tree in the forest, even one that
lies close to the trail, unless the point at which one must leave
the trail to find the tree is well marked. Wattanasin’s preferred
embodiments do blaze a trail through the forest; one that runs
close by Fujikawa’s proposed tree. His application, however,
does not direct one to the proposed tree in particular, and does
not teach the point at which one should leave the trail to find
it.69
The Federal Circuit’s ambivalence toward the content of the
written description standard is also evident in Hyatt v. Boone.70 In
Hyatt, the Board pointed out that the written description on which
Hyatt sought to rely did not expressly disclose the limitations of the
interference count.71 The Board insisted that disclosure would satisfy
the written description requirement if the “necessary and only
reasonable construction” a person skilled in the art would give was
one that clearly supported each positive limitation in the count.72
While the Board’s standard seems entirely consistent with the
standard used to evaluate claims of inherent disclosure, it arguably
calls for more disclosure than a straightforward “possession” standard
would require.73 The Federal Circuit claimed to see no distinction
between the possibly competing standards, but then adopted the
necessity criterion:
Precedent has used both phrases, as well as others. . . . We do
not view these various expressions as setting divergent
standards for compliance with § 112.  In all cases, the purpose
69. Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1571.
70. 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (considering a written description issue in a
§ 135 interference action against Hyatt’s issued patent). Hyatt sought to establish priority by
relying on a 1970 patent application, and Boone argued that the 1970 application did not
provide an adequate written description of the interference count. More specifically, Boone
claimed an effective filing date of July, 1971 (through nine prior applications). Hyatt sought to
rely on a December 28, 1970, application arguing that, even though the 1970 application did not
expressly describe the limitations of the interference count, the application did include a claim
that was directed to the genus of which the interference count represented a subgenus.
71. Id. at 1353.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Tronzo, 156 F.3d at 1158. See also Hyatt, 146 F.3d at 1354.
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of the description requirement is ‘to ensure that the inventor
had possession, as of the filing date of the application relied
on, of the specific subject matter later claimed by him.’  In re
Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1351-52, 196 USPQ 465, 467 (CCPA
1978).  Thus, the written description must include all of the
limitations of the interference count, or the applicant must
show that any absent text is necessarily comprehended in the
description provided and would have been so understood at the
time the patent application was filed.”74
Here, as in previous cases, the Federal Circuit missed an opportunity
to shed some light on the written description standard.75
Perhaps the most important recent development in the unsteady
evolution of the possession standard is the “essential element” gloss
articulated in Gentry Gallery.76 The invention in Gentry Gallery
addressed the anti-social behavior encouraged by the original design
of L-shaped sectional sofas. Apparently, Americans want recliners
conjoined with their sectional sofas and adjustment controls for their
recliners. Unimaginative sofa designers operating under these
constraints concluded that they could only position the recliners on
either end of the “L.” While this provided an outer arm for each
recliner on which controls could be located, it also forced designers
to position the recliners at right angles to one another, which might
stifle conversation and present inconveniences in television
viewing.77 The invention disclosed in the patent-in-suit rendered the
sectional sofa fit for social interaction by facing the recliners in the
same direction and placing a “console” between them to
accommodate the adjustment controls.78
Apparently, the broadest claims originally filed in the Gentry
Gallery patent included limitations directed to both the console and
the controls, specifying that the controls were “located upon the
74. Hyatt, 146 F.3d at 1354-55.
75. Since issues of inherent disclosure will presumably be at issue in most written
description cases, this is not a trivial point.
76. Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1475.
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center console.”79 However, during the prosecution, the applicant
amended several of the claims to define a “double reclining seat
sectional sofa section,” a contrived structural label encompassing the
pair of recliners and the console. These claims recited the location of
the controls more broadly as being “mounted on the double reclining
seat sofa section.”80
In one respect, the court’s application of a written description
analysis is not unlike other written description cases, where the
question is whether later-added claims are supported by the original
disclosure. In another respect, the court’s deployment of the written
description requirement here is fairly unusual, given that the
invention resides in the “predictable” mechanical arts.81
The court found a violation of the written description requirement
based on a newly minted “essential element” test.82 This test seems to
provide that where a disclosure unambiguously identifies certain
elements of an invention as “essential” that disclosure only supports
later-filed claims, to the extent that those claims recite the essential
79. Id. at 1479.
80. Id. at 1475 (reciting claim one of the patent-in-suit).
81. The major theme of one commentator’s criticism of Gentry Gallery is the
incorrectness of extending the written description beyond the “unpredictable” arts (i.e.,
chemistry, biotechnology, etc.) to the “predictable” ones. Pretty, supra note 14, at 476-77.
Perhaps because the invention at issue originated from the “predictable” arts, no
enablement issue reached the Federal Circuit. At first glance , it might seem that the
“controls on console” disclosure would easily enable the ordinary artisan to make and
use the invention without undue experimentation even if the controls were relocated as
allowed under the claim at issue. But careful consideration of the evidence,
particularly the obviousness evidence, might suggest a different conclusion. Berkline,
the defendant, argued that the claimed invention would have been obvious in view of
the combination of a standard L-shaped sectional sofa with an armless recliner having
a push-button control on its side (described in the “Talley” reference).
134 F.3d at 1477-78. But the evidence showed, to the court’s satisfaction, that redesign of the
controls would have been necessary in order to incorporate the Talley recliner into a standard
sectional sofa and that redesign would not have been apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art
absent experimentation. Id. at 1478. This determination might be probative on the enablement
question whether a claim to controls mounted anywhere on a “double reclining seat sectional
sofa section” is enabled by disclosure of controls mounted on a console. Perhaps a showing
could have been made that moving the controls elsewhere than the console would have required
undue experimentation. Thus, the court might plausibly have avoided the written description
requirement altogether by applying the enablement criterion more thoughtfully.
82. 134 F.3d at 1479-80.
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elements.83 The court did not indicate that its essential element test—
if, indeed, the court meant to set forth a test— was intended to
supplant the “possession” standard, but it takes no great imagination
to view the essential element test as a new gloss on the possession
standard.
The essential element formulation is counterproductive in several
ways. First, it injects the inventor’s subjective intent into the
possession standard. That is, proving whether or not an element is
essential rests fundamentally on the applicant’s express or inferred
intent.  For example, the Gentry Gallery court appears to have found
some significance in the inventor’s testimony that “locating the
controls on the console is definitely the way we solved [the problem
of building sectional sofa with parallel recliners] on the original
group [of sofas].”84 The court also made much of the patent
application’s recitation of the “objects of the invention” the court
reasoned that because the object of the invention referred to using the
console to accommodate the controls, it followed that locating the
controls elsewhere departed from the object of the invention.85
Second, the essential element standard is especially manipulable. It
had been well established that allowing judges to dissect claims in
search of the “gist” of the invention was contrary to principles of
modern claim construction, precisely because it reposed too much
faith in hindsight judicial assessment.86 The same danger is present
when a court is free to dissect a disclosure into those individual
83. Id. at 1479 (referring to the “essential element” standard).
84. 134 F.3d at 1478. This enhances the power of the written description requirement as a
litigation weapon, much in the manner of the best mode requirement. See, e.g., Pretty, supra
note 13, at 478-79 (commenting critically on the subjective aspect of the essential element
formulation).
85. 134 F.3d at 1479. The court finally did shift into what seems a more objective
analysis, considering whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have “clearly” understood
which elements were “important” and which were accessible. Id. at 1480.
86. Indeed, Judge Rich cited this principle in Vas-Cath as the basis for error in a lower
court’s written description analysis. In the district court, Judge Easterbrook, sitting by
designation, had opined that the disclosure at issue (drawings from a design patent) failed the
written description requirement because the drawings did not “describe what is novel and
important” in the claimed invention. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 745 F. Supp. 517, 522 (N.D.
Ill. 1990). Reciting the familiar maxim that there is “no legally recognizable or protected
‘essential’ element . . . of the invention,” the Federal Circuit concluded that it was error for
Judge Easterbrook to have strayed from the claimed invention. 935 F.2d at 1565.
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components deemed essential and those deemed non-essential.
Fortunately, judicial reaction to Gentry Gallery has not been
uniformly enthusiastic. In Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. v.
Zebco Corp.,87 Judge Clevenger applied what could prove to be an
important limiting gloss on the Gentry Gallery “essential element”
test. According to Judge Clevenger, “Gentry Gallery . . . considers
the situation where the patent’s disclosure makes crystal clear that a
particular (i.e., narrow) understanding of a claim term is an ‘essential
element of [the inventor’s] invention.’”88 Under this view, Gentry
Gallery was based upon “clear statements” that stated the purpose of
the invention and statements that “unambiguously limited” the
meaning of the key claim language.89 Similarly, the court in Gaus v.
Conair Corp.90 commented that it did “not read Gentry as requiring a
rigid mechanical relationship between the claims of a patent and the
rest of the specification . . . .”91
Other recent district court decisions likewise approach Gentry
Gallery with varying degrees of skepticism. For example, in Purdue
Pharma,92 the court found a violation of the written description
requirement but emphasized the primacy of the “possession” test and
characterized Gentry Gallery’s notion of the omitted element as
relevant to the overarching question of possession:
While the Court hesitates to refer to the Gentry analysis as a
“test” under the written description requirement absent further
guidance from the Federal Circuit, the Court believes that
87. 175 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (considering whether the claim term “heading” in a
“heading” lock unit for a boat’s trolling motor was supported by the written description in a
parent application).
88. Id. at 993 (citing Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479).
89. Id. One would doubt whether the Gentry Gallery’s written description in fact spoke
with “crystal clarity” as Judge Clevenger seems to intimate.
90. 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1697 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying defendant’s motion for summary
judgment for violation of the written description requirement).
91. Id. The court proceeded to equate “essential” features with novel features,
commenting that “[o]nly when the [disputed feature] is an important part of the invention,
distinguishing it from prior art, will Gentry come into play.” Id. (emphasis added).
92. Purdue Pharma, L.P. v. F.H. Faulding & Co., 48 F. Supp.2d 420 (D. Del. 1999)
(concluding that the written description was violated where the claims recited a ratio of carbon
constituents in a claimed composition to be greater than two, the written description provided
examples where the ratio was above and below two, and the “greater than [two]” limitation did
not appear in the original claims).
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whether the claimed invention omits an element which was
essential to the invention as originally described is at least part
of determining whether the applicant was in possession of the
invention at the time of filing.93
Similarly, in Lacks Industries, Inc.,94 the court clearly signaled its
discomfort in applying Gentry Gallery by suggesting that the
elements must not only be “essential elements” for purposes of the
Gentry Gallery test, but they also needed to be “the essence of the
invention itself.”95
The district court’s decision in Reiffin v. Microsoft96 was of
another stripe altogether. To date, it unquestionably represents the
most enthusiastic application of Gentry Gallery, and seems likely to
yield the most important new pronouncement of the written
description requirement as it makes its way to the Federal Circuit.97
It is impossible to tell from the face of the opinion whether the
Reiffin court’s application of the so-called “omitted element” test is
sensible. However, the court’s analysis provides little reassurance
that the “omitted element test” will be applied in a consistent and
predictable fashion. First, the court emphasized that four elements not
expressly appearing in the claims at issue98 nevertheless initially
93. Id. at 431.
94. Lacks Indus., Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d 702
(E.D. Mich. 1999).
95. Id. at 725 (refusing to grant summary judgment of invalidity for non-compliance with
the written description requirement on the rationale that there were genuinely disputed fact
issues concerning whether the use of plastic panels and the use of a specified type of wheel
were “essential elements” of the invention). See also Thomson Consumer Elec., Inc., v.
Innovatron, S.A., 43 F. Supp.2d 26, 32 n.4 (D.D.C. 1999) (“In Gentry, the court narrowed a
broad claim to the scope of the disclosure based on a series of considerations concerning the
patent’s purpose and the inventor’s objective intent, which are not present in this case.”)
96. 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1274 (N.D.Cal. 1998). The case involves claims issued in 1997 and
allegedly entitled to the filing date of a 1982 application. Id. at 1276. The claims relate to
“multi-threading” technology, which gives computers the ability to switch rapidly between
tasks. Id. at 1274-75.
97. See Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., Appeal No. 98-1502 (Fed. Cir 1999) (argued Oct. 7,
1999). Interestingly, the district court in Reiffin relied in part on the reissue decision of the
Supreme Court in U.S. Industrial Chemical, Inc. Reiffin, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1277. See supra
notes 40-44 and accompanying text (questioning the current vitality of U.S. Industrial
Chemical).
98. The four elements in question were “an editor, a compiler, an interrupt means, and a
return means.” 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1276.
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appeared in the “summary of the invention” section of the
application, the patent’s abstract, the background section, and the
statement of objects of the invention.99 The court’s reliance on the
abstract to comment on the patent’s validity is unfortunate.
Moreover, the court’s reliance on the “objects of the invention” is
suspect, given that it has been common practice for patent lawyers to
draft “objects” that correspond to the elements of the originally filed
claims. If the court deems any recitation in the “objects” an
“essential” element for purposes of the written description
requirement, tremendous numbers of claims could be at risk,
approaching a per se prohibition against broadening claims after
filing. Second, the court conceded that Reiffin’s specification did not
contain language expressly requiring the four omitted elements as
part of the claimed invention, but one court did find that because
those elements seemed at least “important,” they should be deemed
essential.100 The court’s holding is conceivably consistent with
Gentry Gallery, but it certainly appears to be inconsistent with the
more recent Federal Circuit pronouncement in Johnson v. Zebco that
an element is only deemed essential when the disclosure is “crystal
clear” on the point.101
Thus, quite apart from the question whether Reiffin is correctly
decided ultimately, the Reiffin analysis amply illustrates the potential
for mischief the “essential” element test carries. The court shifted
without hesitation from an “essential” element analysis to an
“important” element analysis. This shift moves perilously close to a
test that merely asks whether a given element is described as part of
the preferred embodiment and invalidates any claims that are drawn
more broadly than the disclosed embodiment. The Reiffin case
presents the Federal Circuit with an important opportunity to speak
against this unbridled interpretation of the essential element test, if
not to dispose of it altogether.102
99. Id. at 1279-80.
100. Id. at 1280. “Reiffin’s 1982 patent application does not expressly say that the only
possible embodiment of his invention involved the four elements.” Id.
101. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
102. It will be interesting to see whether the Federal Circuit chooses an alternative route—
discovering a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. Compliance
with the written description requirement has, after all, been denominated a question of fact. See
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Clarifying statements in the Federal Circuit’s pending Reiffin
decision could also benefit the Revised PTO Guidelines. The Revised
PTO Guidelines appear to subscribe fully to the essential element
test. They expressly adopt Gentry Gallery’s essential element
approach to the possession standard without illuminating the meaning
of “essential.” Thus, the Guidelines direct examiners to:
review the claims and the entire specification, including the
specific embodiments, figures, and sequence listings, to
understand what applicant identified as the essential
distinguishing characteristics of the invention.  The analysis of
whether the specification complies with the written description
requirement requires the examiner to determine the
correspondence between what the applicant has described as
the essential identifying characteristic features of the
invention, i.e., what the applicant has demonstrated possession
of, and what the applicant has claimed.  Such a review is
conducted from the standpoint of one skilled in the art at the
time the application was filed.103
It seems unlikely that burdening the essential element test with
additional interchangeable adjectives will meaningfully enhance the
test. The Reiffin decision, perhaps, will render this exercise
unnecessary.
C. Barriers to Coherence
This subpart examines some of the consequences of employing an
unrestricted “possession” standard for the written description
requirement. One consequence is an unpredictable, and even
arbitrary, application of the requirement, especially as a result of
infra note 104 and accompanying text.
103. Revised PTO Guidelines, supra note 24, at 71435. See also id. at 71434 (stating that
for new or amended claims, or claims that seek the benefit of an earlier priority or filing date,
“each claim must include all elements which applicant has described as essential”).
The PTO acknowledges that in the final analysis, the essential element analysis might
merely be duplicative of enablement: “A claim which omits matter disclosed to be essential to
the invention as described in the specification or in other statements of record may also be
subject to rejection under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 112, para. 1 as not enabling, or under 35 U.S.C. 112,
para. 2.” Id. at 71438 n.20 (citing, inter alia, Reiffin v. Microsoft).
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overzealous appellate review. Another consequence is messy
interfaces with other doctrines, which also creates potential barriers
to coherence.
1. Overzealous Appellate Review
The Federal Circuit characterizes the written description
requirement as a question of fact.104 One may argue that, even if the
substantive standard for the written description requirement imposes
little or no restraint on judicial power, categorizing the written
description requirement as factual minimizes the opportunity for
overzealous appellate application. Despite the opposing argument
that this might only mean untoward trial court applications of the
written description requirement are more likely to be preserved on
appeal, it is incorrect to conclude from existing case law that the
Federal Circuit will exhibit any great restraint in written description
cases.
In the first place, it is not clear that the question of fact label is
meaningful for the written description requirement. Numerous
written description cases involve questions of entitlement to the filing
date of a predecessor application under § 120.105 Because the Federal
Circuit denominated entitlement to priority under § 120 as a question
of law,106 it can readily justify plenary review of most written
description issues.107 The apparent deference the Federal Circuit
would give to written description analyses on appeal is, therefore, as
illusory as the written description requirement itself.
More importantly, there may well be a divergence of views at the
Federal Circuit on the level of scrutiny that written description
decisions should receive.  The opinions in the Federal Circuit’s
Suntiger case illustrate the point.  The claims at issue concerned
lenses for sunglasses and specified transmission characteristics over a
104. Tronzo, 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
105. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1994).
106. See, e.g., Racing Strollers, Inc. v. TRI Indus., Inc., 878 F.2d 1418, 1419 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
107. See, e.g., In re Daniels, 144 F.3d 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (addressing compliance with
the written description requirement in the context of a design patent claiming the benefit of an
earlier application’s filing date).
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relatively narrow numeric range. Because the applicant claimed the
benefit of the filing date of a parent application, which disclosed
transmission characteristics over a broader range, the claim
implicated the written description requirement. The parties submitted
conflicting expert affidavits on the question of what the parent
application would have disclosed to one of ordinary skill in the art.
Citing this conflict, the district court refused to grant summary
judgment for invalidity.108
The Federal Circuit affirmed, but Judge Lourie (the author of both
the Gentry Gallery and Eli Lilly opinions) dissented, and it is this
dissent that makes the case significant. While acknowledging the
customary practice of deference, Judge Lourie found no need for
deference in Suntiger,109 reasoning that the parent application clearly
failed to provide an adequate written description for the claims at
issue.110
The analysis in the dissenting opinion is surprising in several
respects. First, the dissent relies on the proposition that “[v]alidity is
a question of law, based on facts ,”111 notwithstanding Federal Circuit
cases characterizing the written description question as a fact
question.112 Second, the dissent espouses the view that, as a matter of
law, “disclosure of a generic expression encompassing a large
number of possible variants is not a description of all of them.”113
This is clearly an overstatement— whether the proposition is true
certainly depends upon whether one of ordinary skill in the art would
consider the generic description adequate.114
Finally, the dissent appears entirely comfortable with substituting
its own judgment for that of the district court on the question of what
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1337.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Moreover, the proposition that validity is a question of law is overbroad in any event
because courts have clearly defined some validity doctrines as questions of fact. See, e.g., Atlas
Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (recognizing anticipation is a
question of fact).
113. 189 F.3d at 1337-38.
114. This in turn would presumably depend upon factors such as the size of the genus and
the presence or absence of additional teachings (“blazemarks” in Judge Rich’s vernacular) in
the written description.
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one of ordinary skill in the art would glean from the description in the
parent application.
While it is regrettable that the district court was not able to see
through the “experts” asserting that [the claim limitations at
issue] were described in [the relevant drawing from the parent
application], we should not perpetuate the fiction that there is a
genuine dispute when we can see that the figure does not
disclose the key limitations. This is not an issue concerning
which testimony is necessary to explain complex language, or
one where the demeanor of witnesses might matter. We can
read the patent.115
The last statement— that the Federal Circuit can simply read the
patent and resolve a written description issue— illustrates why the
written description requirement is a threat to the coherence of
disclosure doctrines— it easily becomes the instrument of judicial
caprice.116
In any event, the dissent’s position is not well supported in the
law. The Federal Circuit’s own cases establish that the relevant
inquiry in a written description case is whether one of ordinary skill
in the art would agree that the description reasonably conveys that the
inventor had possession of the invention. The ordinary artisan’s
implicit understanding of the document is critical to that
determination. Federal Circuit judges should refrain from making ab
initio pronouncements on the matter, particularly in the face of
conflicting evidence. The extent to which Federal Circuit judges have
been willing to inject themselves into the fray in this manner is
further indication of the broader problem of the potential for arbitrary
decision making under the cloak of the written description
requirement.117
115. 189 F.3d at 1338.
116. Perhaps the caprice will be tempered by the wisdom and experience that Federal
Circuit judges can bring to bear. On the other hand, District Court judges will presumably
believe that they, too, can “read the patent” and deploy the written description requirement
according to their own sensibilities.
117. Similarly, the written description requirement as construed in Eli Lilly may give courts
too much discretion to reshape claims in biotechnology cases. For a detailed policy argument
along these general lines, see Mueller, supra note 20, at 633.
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The Federal Circuit’s decision in Union Oil118 provides perhaps
the best illustration of the sharp contrast in judicial views about how
the written description requirement should be applied and about how
it should be reviewed on appeal. Judge Rader upheld a JMOL denial
on a jury verdict in which the jury had found no violation of the
written description requirement. The claims at issue were directed to
gasoline compositions that were specified not in terms of chemical
structure, but in terms of various functional characteristics, expressed
in numeric ranges.119 In analyzing the patent for compliance with the
written description requirement, Judge Rader pointed to language in
the written description that closely tracked the ranges of functional
characteristics called out in the claims, statements of general
guidance in the written description, and testimony that one of
ordinary skill in the art would have been guided by the written
description to formulate specific compositions satisfying the
claims.120 Judge Rader also appeared to signal his disagreement with
Eli Lilly, asserting that the CCPA had “clarified that disclosure in an
originally filed claim satisfies the written description requirement.”121
Judge Lourie dissented, accusing the majority of analyzing the
written description issue purely through enablement reasoning.122
Judge Lourie found adequate description of the claim limitations in
the specification, but not of the claimed compositions “as such,” and
viewed this as grounds for reversal.123
The Union Oil dissent reinforces the point that the written
description requirement as currently formulated is unduly susceptible
118. Union Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
119. Slip op. at 3 (setting forth claim 117 of the patent-in-suit).
120. Id. at 14-19. Judge Rader’s analysis also drew from Federal Circuit and CCPA written
description precedent. Judge Rader attempted to distinguish Ruschig on the basis that it had
involved claims copied in from another application to provoke an interference, id. at 20-21, and
attempted to analogize to cases in which numeric ranges set forth in the claims did not
correspond exactly to the ranges disclosed in the specification. Id. at 22, citing Ralston Purina
Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., 772 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
121. Slip op. at 16, n.4, citing In re Gardner, 480 F.2d 879, 880 (CCPA 1973). 
122. Slip op. at 25 (Lourie, J., dissenting). This objection appears to carry some weight,
and neatly illustrates the difficulty of uncoupling written description from enablement. The
objection might be more compelling, however, if the Federal Circuit could explain (without
resorting to the empty rhetoric of the written description requirement) why a disclosure that
complies with the enablement requirement should be deemed deficient.
123. See, e.g., id. at 26 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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to overzealous appellate review. Indeed, the Union Oil majority
expressly concludes as much:
In its arguments, the dissent discounts the skill in this art,
which, the jury found, knows the composition of gasolines
from the specification’s description of characteristics. Further,
the dissent discounts the jury’s role in finding, as a matter of
fact, that the inventor satisfied the written description
requirement, preferring instead its own “findings” about the
knowledge of skilled artisans and about the sufficiency of
disclosures.124
The Union Oil dissent also illustrates the disturbing tendency to
use the written description to limit the scope of the claims to those
embodiments which are expressly disclosed in the specification. Even
though the dissent acknowledges the general principle that “a patent
need not describe the claimed subject matter in precisely the same
terms as used in the claims,”125 it is not clear how the patentee could
have satisfied the dissent’s mandate for a description of the claimed
compositions “as such” except by express disclosure of any particular
composition within the claim.
2. Messy Interfaces
While it is particularly difficult to determine where enablement
should properly end and the written description requirement properly
begin, this problem is merely symptomatic of a broader issue—
interfacing the written description requirement with a number of
other patent doctrines. These multiple interfaces create uncertainties
with attendant costs. More fundamentally, however, they may
provide opportunities in which the written description requirement is
used as an artifice to circumvent traditional limitations in other
doctrines. If the written description requirement continues to expand,
it could become a source of considerable chicanery, with
destabilizing influences extending well beyond the adequacy of
disclosure issue.
124. Slip op. at 20 n.5.
125. Slip op. at 27 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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The most serious interface problem, as noted throughout this
Article, is the interface with enablement.126 However, claim
construction illustrates another key example.127 Some cases indicate
the Federal Circuit is willing to rely upon probable non-compliance
with the written description requirement as a justification for
rejecting one claim construction in favor of another in an
infringement context.128 In form, this argument is easily supportable
under the maxim that claims be construed so as to preserve their
validity.129 This argument also rests on the entirely non-controversial
proposition that claims be construed in view of the written
description portion of the specification. The problem is that the line
126. Even if the Federal Circuit is unwilling to rid the patent system of the written
description requirement, it should revisit the enablement/written description interface and
attempt to improve upon the conclusory rhetoric that typifies existing case law. See, e.g., Vas-
Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (concluding that “the purpose
of the ‘written description’ requirement is broader than to merely explain how to ‘make and
use;’ the applicant must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of
the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.”). Much of the analysis in
this Article suggests that this task may be impossible.
127. To be sure, there are also illustrations of interfaces that are not problematic, even if
they are subtle. For example, one cannot fault the line of cases exploring the relationship
between claim-anticipating disclosures and claim-supporting disclosures. A disclosure of a
species generally anticipates a later claim to a genus encompassing that species, but the
disclosure of the species would not necessarily provide a “written description” of the genus.
See, e.g., Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (explaining the relationship).
See also Rengo Co. Ltd. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981) (describing the
written description requirement and the § 112 definiteness requirement as “complementary”
standards which “approach a similar problem from different directions”); see also Vas-Cath,
935 F.2d at 1561 (citing Rengo with approval).
128. For example, the court has recently stated that “[a] patent claim should be construed to
encompass at least one disclosed embodiment in the written description portion of the patent
specification. This maxim flows from the statutory [written description] requirement.” Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See also North American
Vaccine, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993):
It is the responsibility of patent applicants to disclose their inventions adequately. 35
U.S.C. § 112. There is no such disclosure of the concept of avoiding crosslinking
along the backbone in this patent. Thus, an invention of that breadth does not meet the
description requirement . . .. A patent applicant cannot disclose and claim an invention
narrowly and then, in the course of an infringement suit, argue effectively that the
claims should be construed to cover that which is neither described nor enabled in the
patent.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
129. See, e.g., Carmen Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 937 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(“Claims should be so construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity.”).
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between construing the claim “in view of” the specification and
improperly importing limitations from the specification into the claim
is already a fine one. Thus, injecting the written description
requirement into the analytical mix may obliterate the line altogether
in any given case. Because the written description requirement is so
amorphous, it will be very easy for alleged infringers to argue
persuasively that the specification identifies certain elements as
“essential” and that a claim construction omitting such elements must
be rejected. The written description requirement could then operate as
the ultimate hedge against broad claim construction, shrinking the
scope of claims to something approximating that of the expressly
disclosed embodiments of the invention.
Another illustration— admittedly one of trifling practical
consequences— concerns a line of cases interpreting the “regards”
clause of § 112, paragraph two.130 In one decision, the district court
granted summary judgment of invalidity under the “regards” clause
where the inventor’s deposition testimony appeared to reveal a
different subjective notion of the invention than the contents of the
claims at issue.131
On the surface this inquiry may seem different from matching the
disclosure to the claim to determine whether the disclosure places the
ordinary artisan in “possession” of the claimed invention. However,
as a practical matter the inquiries will overlap substantially,
especially when possession is assessed via the Gentry Gallery
essential element test.132 To the extent the essential element test
130. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (1994) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.”) (emphasis added). Arguments invoking the “regards” clause of
§ 112, paragraph two, are rare.
131. Inpro, Inc. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 657 F. Supp. 935, 942-45 (N.D. Ill. 1987). Some
support for this analysis can be derived from C.C.P.A. decisions. See, e.g., In re Prater, 415
F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“Inasmuch as claim 9, thus interpreted, reads on subject
matter for which appellants do not seek coverage, and therefore tacitly admit to be beyond that
which ‘applicant regards as his invention,’ we feel that the claim fails to comply with 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 which requires that ‘the specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.’”). Id. at 1404 (emphasis in original).
132. For example, the same inventor testimony that allegedly identifies “essential
elements” of the invention, which fail to appear in a claim, might simply be characterized as the
inventor’s subjective notion of what the invention is and be considered relevant to the “regards”
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draws on evidence outside the specification, there is likely to be
overlap with § 112, paragraph two.
III.
The “written description” jurisprudence demonstrates that modern
U.S. courts periodically perceive a need to reach beyond the
enablement criterion to redress an alleged disclosure deficiency. This
practice persists in spite of the failure to articulate meaningful
standards beyond the enablement standard. This Part analyzes
European and British law for evidence of the same phenomenon and
concludes that, while the enablement criterion has emerged as the
worldwide minimum standard for adequacy of disclosure in modern
patent systems,133 both European and British law also appear
burdened with doctrines that are analogous to the U.S. written
description requirement.134
A. “Sufficiency” and “Support” in European Patent Law
Although the rhetorical labels certainly differ, a similar pattern of
disclosure doctrines, evident in the bifurcation of enablement and
written description in U.S. law, is also present in European patent
law. Not surprisingly, one also finds the attending expressions of
confusion. Disclosure requirements under the European Patent
inquiry.
133. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing TRIPs article 29(1) and article
3(1) of the proposed Patent Law Treaty). TRIPs article 29(1) expressly gives members
discretion to impose a best mode requirement and does not preclude members from imposing
additional adequacy of disclosure requirements such as a written description requirement. Id.
See generally J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property
Protection Under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L LAW. 345 (1995)
(providing a summary of the patent provisions in the TRIPs agreement and the underlying
normative structure). Article 3(1) of the proposed Patent Law Treaty contained slightly different
language, imposing an enablement requirement but also specifying that the application “contain
a description.” WEGNER, supra note 5, at 151 (citing article 3(2)(a)). However, the negotiating
history indicates that this language was not intended as an effort to incorporate the U.S. “written
description” requirement into the treaty. Id. at 157.
134. Necessarily, this comparative analysis is selective, focusing on the interface between
enablement (or “sufficiency”) and written description analogs (“support,” “fair basis”). It does
not attempt, for example, to give a detailed account of the nature of enablement itself and its
development in the jurisdictions of interest.
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Convention (“EPC”) rest upon a core requirement of enablement,
embodied in EPC article 83.135 However, the EPC also includes, in
article 84, the requirement that the claims be “clear and concise and
be supported by the description.”136
This distinction matters. Compliance with article 83’s enablement
requirement is an issue both for original examination and for post-
grant opposition.137 In contrast, compliance with article 84 is strictly a
matter for original examination,138 a matter that excited considerable
commentary in Europe, especially in the context of allegedly
overbroad biotechnology claims.139 As a conceptual matter and as a
135. Article 83 does not use the term “enabling” but clearly sets forth an enablement
standard: “The European patent application must disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently
clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.” EPC art. 83. See, e.g.,
GERALD PATERSON, THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM 533 (1992) (providing the full text of the
European Patent Convention).
136. EPC Art. 84; See PATERSON, supra note 134, at 133 (§ 3-09) (confirming that the
disclosure must perform both an enablement and a support function as separately
conceptualized in articles 83 and 84).
137. See EPC Art. 100(b), in PATERSON, supra note 134, at 540 (“Oppositions may only be
filed on the grounds that: . . . (b) the European patent does not disclose the invention in a
manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.”).
138. Id. (using the language of the article 83 requirement but not the article 84 requirement
in identifying the possible grounds for opposition). For relevant cases confirming this
distinction, see, e.g., T 23/86, Naimer/Computer-controlled switch, [1987] E.P.O.R. 383
(1986); T 48/85, NRDC/Eimeria necatrix, [1987] E.P.O.R. 138 (1986); see generally
CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF PATENT AGENTS, C.I.P.A. GUIDE TO THE PATENTS ACT § 14.29
(1996) [hereinafter C.I.P.A. GUIDE]. There are limitations to this rule. For example, compliance
with article 84 can arise in a post-grant opposition proceeding in which the patentee proposes to
amend the claims. See, e.g., T 301/87, Biogen/Alpha-interferon, [1990] E.P.O.R. 190 (1989).
Another example concerns the “clarity” prong of Article 84, which may be challenged post-
grant. See T 684/89 Cyberexact/Printer Ribbon Errors,[1993] E.P.O.R. 173 (1992) (“While it is
correct that a lack of clarity under Article 84 does not in itself constitute a Ground of
Opposition, especially if the disputed claim has not been amended, the fact remains that
objections to clarity can be made, if necessary, under Article 100(b) in assessing the fulfillment
of the conditions of Article 100.”). Moreover, the House of Lord’s Biogen decision offers an
even broader rationalization for the use of article 84 “support” arguments post-grant. See infra
Part III.B.2.
One scholar reports that the apparent rationale for excluding article 84 challenges from
most post-grant settings was the assumption that courts would correctly decide claim breadth in
the course of patent examination. Michael Kern, Patentability of Biotechnological Inventions in
the United Kingdom: The House of Lords Charts the Course, 29 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT 247, 268 (1998).
139. See, e.g., Tim Roberts, Broad Claims for Biotechnological Inventions, 16 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 371, 373 (1994) (urging that European law be changed to allow Article 84
lack of support objections to be raised in opposition proceedings and in revocation proceedings
in national courts).
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matter of practical consequences, it is necessary to attempt to
distinguish between article 83 “sufficiency” and article 84 “support,”
just as it is necessary under current U.S. patent law to distinguish
between enablement and written description. It is perhaps telling,
then, that the attempt to articulate a standard for article 84 “support”
that is truly distinct from article 83 “sufficiency” has not revealed any
profound insight. Instead, the project has generated rhetoric and
reasoning quite comparable to U.S. written description jurisprudence,
both in its reliance on artificial distinctions and in its resort to a
dubious “essential elements” formulation.
1. Artificial Distinctions Between “Sufficiency” and “Support”
EPO jurisprudence on article 84 does embrace the notion, familiar
to U.S. adequacy of disclosure law, that requiring a strict correlation
between the scope of the express disclosure and the scope of the
claim is counterproductive. For example, in T 133/85, the Board of
Appeal acknowledged that a principal purpose of the support
requirement in article 84 is to modulate the “width” of the claims, yet
the Board made clear it considered that the term “support” allows for
some “generalization” of the claim vis a vis the description:
[T]he requirement in Article 84 EPC that the claims shall be
supported by the description is of importance in ensuring that
the monopoly given by a granted patent generally corresponds
to the invention which has been described in the application,
and that the claims are not drafted so broadly that they
dominate activities which are not dependent upon the invention
which has been described in the application. On the other hand,
Article 84 EPC clearly envisages (by use of the word
‘supported’) that the ‘matter for which protection is sought’
can be defined in a generalised form, compared to the specific
description of the invention.140
This issue raises the difficult question of how much claim
“generalization” the patentee may undertake before crossing over into
140. CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF PATENT AGENTS, 2 EUROPEAN PATENTS HANDBOOK
56/199, 103:T 133/85-6 (2d ed. 1995).
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the prohibited practice of claiming “covetously.”141 The European
Patent Office (EPO) Guidelines for Examination attempt to flesh out
this concept, but make little headway. The Guidelines take refuge in
the proposition that the extent of allowable disconnect or
generalization between the claims and the disclosure is a matter for
case-by-case resolution.142 Beyond this broad pronouncement, the
Guidelines do little more than restate the article 83 enablement
standard. The text of Guideline 6.3 is indicative:
As a general rule, a claim should be regarded as supported by
the description unless there are exceptionally well-founded
reasons for believing that the skilled man would be unable, on
the basis of the information given in the application as filed, to
extend the particular teaching of the description to the whole of
the field claimed by using routine methods of experimentation
or analysis.143
In proceeding to offer two specific examples, the Guidelines quite
correctly acknowledge that:
[A]lthough an objection of lack of support is an objection
under Art. 84, it can often . . . also be considered as an
objection of insufficient disclosure of the invention under Art.
83, the objection being that the disclosure is insufficient to
enable the skilled person to carry out the “invention” over the
whole of the broad field claimed (although sufficient in respect
of a narrow “invention”).144
EPO case law under the article 84 support requirement reflects
this same overlap with article 83. For example, in T 409/91,145 the
141. In T 409/91, the Board insisted that article 84’s “support” requirement was designed
to prevent “overtly ‘covetous’ claiming”— to prevent patentees from attempting to “monopolise
a technical area extending well beyond” the patentee’s technical contribution. T 409/91,
Exxon/Fuel Oils, [1994] E.P.O.R. 149 (1993), reprinted in 6 EUROPEAN PATENTS HANDBOOK,
supra note 139, at 103:T 409/91-1, -6.
142. EPO Guidelines for Examination, ch. 3, 6.2 (1995), full text reprinted in 2 EUROPEAN
PATENTS HANDBOOK, supra note 139, at 56/199.
143. Id. at ch. 3, 6.3.
144. Id. at 6.4.
145. T 409/91, supra note 140, reprinted at 103:T 409/91-1. For commentary applauding
the Board’s approach in T 409/91, see Matthias Brandi-Dohrn, The Unduly Broad Claim, 25
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claim at issue was directed to a fuel oil containing wax particles of a
specified size. The disclosure described fuel oil compositions
including not only wax particles within the claimed size range, but
also specified additives as to which the claims were silent. The Board
found numerous problems with this disconnect between the scope of
the disclosure and the scope of the claims. First, according to the
Board, the article 84 support requirement reflected the general
principle that “the definitions in the claims should essentially
correspond to the scope of the invention as disclosed in the
description.”146 However, as the Board articulated the rationale of
article 84, it lapsed into enablement language: “[T]he claims should
not extend to subject matter which, after reading the description,
would still not be at the disposal of the person skilled in the art.”147
Indeed, if the evidence had in fact shown, as the Board suggested
it did, that a skilled artisan could not have prepared the claimed
composition without using the additive one might suppose there
would be no need to resort to article 84, because there would surely
be an enablement problem. The Board, in fact, proceeded to find an
article 83 enablement violation.148 In so doing, the Board again
confronted the problem of relating article 83 to the article 84 support
requirement:
Although the requirements of [a]rticle 83 and [a]rticle 84 are
directed to different parts of the patent application, since
[a]rticle 83 relates to the disclosure of the invention, whilst
[a]rticle 84 deals with the definition of the invention by the
claims, the underlying purpose of the requirement of support
by the description . . . and of the requirement of sufficient
disclosure is the same, namely to ensure that the patent
monopoly should be justified by the actual technical
contribution to the art. Thus, a claim may well be supported by
INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 648 (1994).
146. Id. at 103:T 409/91-5.
147. Id. The Board proceeded to give another example of reliance on the “essential feature”
rhetoric that is strongly comparable to the Gentry Gallery formulation: “[A] technical feature
which is described and highlighted in the description as being an essential feature of the
invention, must also be a part of the independent claim or claims defining this invention.” Id.
(citing T 133/85).
148. Id. at 103:T 409/91-6.
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the description in the sense that it corresponds to it, but still
encompass subject matter which is not sufficiently disclosed
within the meaning of [a]rticle 83 EPC as it cannot be
performed without undue burden, or vice versa.149
This broad pronouncement carries the tone of rationality, but sheds
little light on any distinction between the two requirements often, the
distinction seems more hypothetical than real, as T 409/91 amply
illustrates:
In the present case . . . the reasons why the invention defined in
the claims does not meet the requirement of [a]rticle 83 EPC
are in effect the same as those that lead also to their infringing
[a]rticle 84 EPC, namely that the invention extends to technical
subject matter not made available to the person skilled in the
art by the application as filed, since it was not contested by the
applicant that no information was given to perform the claimed
invention successfully without using the structurally defined
class of additives . . . .150
In the United States, the deployment of an illusory written
description requirement has had adverse consequences for
coherence.151 Interestingly, some of the same consequences are seen
in EPO case law. For example, the EPO may be willing to allow
article 84 support considerations to influence claim construction.152
Similarly, and perhaps more significantly, the EPO has held that a
lack of clarity objection could be reformulated as an insufficiency
objection and thus be raised post-grant, even though an article 84
objection would not be available post-grant.153
149. Id. at 103:T 409/91-6.
150. Id. at 103:T 409/91-6-7.
151. See supra Part II.C.
152. See T 406/86, Wacker/Trichloroethylene, [1989] E.P.O.R. 338 (1988) (referring to the
possibility of using limited claim construction where doing so would obviate an apparent
discontinuity between the scope of the claims and the scope of the disclosure). This would be an
important step considering that it could effectively make article 84 support arguments available
in post-grant proceedings.
153. T 684/89, Cyberexact/Printer ribbon errors, [1993] E.P.O.R. 173 (1992).
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2. The EPO’s “Essential Elements” Formulation
The article 84 jurisprudence has also featured the emergence of
“essential feature” rhetoric. For example, in T 32/82, the European
Patent Office Board of Appeal construed article 84 as requiring the
patentee to “define clearly the object of the invention, that is to say,
indicate all the essential features thereof.”154 The Board proceeded to
define “essential features” as encompassing “all features which are
necessary to obtain the desired effect, or, differently expressed, which
are necessary to solve the technical problem with which the
application is concerned.”155 The Board also employed the “essential
features” rhetoric in T 133/85.156 The test for article 84 support
articulated in T 133/85 seems indistinguishable from the Gentry
Gallery formulation of the written description requirement: “A claim
which does not include a feature which is described in the application
. . . as an essential feature of the invention, and which is therefore
inconsistent with the description, is not supported by the description
for purposes of Article 84 EPC.”157
In T 1055/92,158 the EPO attempted to distinguish between
essential features (whose omission from a claim would give rise to a
violation of the support requirement) and “technical features” (whose
omission from a claim would be of no consequence). Attempting to
explain this most tenuous of distinctions, the Board reasoned that:
[I]t is not always necessary for a claim to identify technical
features or steps in detail . . . . The Board of Appeal considers
it sufficient if the application as a whole (i.e. the claims
154. The Board made clear that this requirement was in addition to the requirement to
present comprehensible claims. Id. However, it was not clear whether the Board was deriving
the “essential features” requirement from the “support” requirement or the “clear and concise”
requirement of article 84. T 32/82, ICI/Control circuit [1979-85] E.P.O.R. B426 (1984),
reprinted in 5 EUROPEAN PATENTS HANDBOOK, supra note 139, at 103:T 32/82-2.
155. Id.
156. T 133/85, XEROX/Amendments, [1989] E.P.O.R. 116 (1988), reprinted in 5
EUROPEAN PATENTS HANDBOOK, supra note 139, at 103:T 133/85-1.
157. Id. See also ROMUALD SINGER & MARGARETE SINGER, THE EUROPEAN PATENT
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 370 (Ralph Lunzer trans., 1995) (discussing the decision and
quoting excerpts).
158. T 1055/92, Ampex Corporation/Clarity, [1995] E.P.O.R. 469 (1994), reprinted in 6
EUROPEAN PATENTS HANDBOOK, supra note 139, at 103:T 1055/92-1.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/4
210.doc 08/24/00
2000] Contending with the “Written Description” Requirement 95
together with the description and drawings) describes the
necessary characteristics of an invention . . . in a degree of
detail such that a person skilled in the art can perform the
invention. This requirement, however, relates to [a]rticle 83
EPC and is not relevant to [a]rticle 84 EPC . . . . However, the
Board of Appeal also agrees with the interpretation of the
meaning of the [a]rticle 84 support requirement] in that all the
features described in the description as being necessary to
carry out the invention (essential features) must be present in a
corresponding claim . . . . Thus, features which are necessary
to solve the technical problem concerned must be present in
the claim.159
Cases such as these may render the Gentry Gallery approach to the
written description requirement more palatable— if the only concern
about Gentry Gallery is that it is an anomaly in the broad picture of
disclosure requirements in major patent systems. However, what is
perhaps more instructive about the European law here is that it shares
another characteristic with recent U.S. law: the inability to
meaningfully separate the written description requirement (or,
analogously, the support requirement) from the enablement
requirement (or, analogously, the “sufficiency” requirement).
This problem arose again in T 694/92,160 which is a recent
example of the Board’s reliance on the “essential features”
formulation.161 In attempting to refine the notion of “essential”
features, the Board clearly lapsed into enablement language:
The essential technical features may also be expressed in
general functional terms, if, from an objective point of view,
such features cannot otherwise be defined more precisely
without restricting the scope of the claim, and if these features
provide instructions which are sufficiently clear for the skilled
person to reduce them to practice without undue burden, i.e.
159. Id. at 103:T 1055/92-7.
160. T 694/92, Mycogen/Modifying Plant Cells, [1998] E.P.O.R. 114 (1996).
161. Id. at 119 (stating that “Article 84 means not only that a claim must be non-ambiguous
and comprehensible, but also that all the essential features of the claimed invention have to be
indicated in the claim, these being the features which are necessary in order to obtain the
desired effect.”).
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with no more than a reasonable amount of experimentation,
and without applying inventive skill.162
The Board openly acknowledged that “questions of clarity or support
may affect the decisions on issues under Article 100 EPC such as . . .
sufficiency of disclosure (Article 83 EPC),”163 but found this utterly
untroubling because both the article 83 sufficiency requirement and
the article 84 support requirement “reflect the same general principle,
namely that the scope of a granted patent should correspond to its
technical contribution to the state of the art.” The Board finally
enunciated a broad rule, that a claim might be “formally” supported
but not supported for purposes of article 84. The key to this
extremely fine distinction lay, not surprisingly, in parsing the rhetoric
of enablement:
[I]t follows that, despite being supported by the description
from a purely formal point of view, claims may not be
considered allowable if they encompass subject-matter which
in the light of the disclosure provided by the description can be
performed only with undue burden or with application of
inventive skill.164
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing as illustrative T 435/91, Unilever/Hexagonal Liquid Crystal Gel [1995]
E.P.O.R. 314 (1994). Indeed, the Board suggested that the support requirement also affected
novelty (Article 54 EPC) and inventive step (Article 56 EPC) determinations. Id. The Board
proceeded to observe that the inventive step analysis in the case before it demonstrated how
closely interrelated and how critical the issues of support of the claims, sufficiency of disclosure
and inventive step are in cases— such as the present one— where it is particularly difficult to
find a proper balance between the breadth of the claims and the actual contribution to the state
of the art by the disclosure of the patent in suit. T 694/92, [1998] E.P.O.R. 114 (1996).
164. Id. The Board proceeded to recite factors it would rely upon to determine whether the
level of detail in the disclosure correlated properly with the scope of the claim. The factors
include, for example, “the character of the technical field” and the state of the “common general
knowledge” as of the filing date. Id. These, of course, correlate to the factors used to evaluate
“undue experimentation” under U.S. enablement law. Id. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731,
737 (Fed. Cir. 1988):
Factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would require undue
experimentation . . . include (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the
amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working
examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative
skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the
breadth of the claims.
Id.
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B. The “Fair Basis” Requirement in British Jurisprudence
British patent law provides an interesting illustration of transition
and fluidity in the application of adequacy of disclosure
requirements. The “fair basis” requirement is of particular interest as
a rough analog to the EPC article 84 “support” requirement and to the
U.S. “written description” requirement. The rise, fall, and arguable
recent resuscitation of the “fair basis” requirement in British patent
law provides yet another illustration of the phenomenon whereby
courts turn to ancillary disclosure doctrines to buttress the
enablement requirement.165
1. “Fair Basis” Before the 1977 Act
Even before British patent law required formal claims, patentees
began to include language in their applications directed at identifying
invention scope. Thus, courts became sensitive to the potential for
“disconformity” between the disclosure and these proto-claims.166
When the British statute began to mandate claims,167 the
disconformity defense persisted.168 Similarly, disconformity had a
role in assuring congruence between the disclosure in a provisional
specification and the complete specification.169
165. While this subpart focuses principally on U.K. precedent, a worthwhile extension of
this study would consider the operation of the “fair basis” requirement under New Zealand and
Australian patent law. In both jurisdictions, “fair basis” remains a statutory requirement for
adequate disclosure. See, e.g., New Zealand Patents Law § 10(4); ANDREW BROWN &
ANTHONY GRANT, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN NEW ZEALAND 6.16 n.2 (1989)
(collecting New Zealand cases dealing with the fair basis requirement). Brown and Grant
indicate that tge New Zealand fair basis law takes as authoritative U.K. precedent under the
1949 Act. Id. Concerning Australia, see, e.g., Patents Act 1990 § 40(3) (Austl.) (successor to
Patents Act 1952 § 40(2)). See also Geoff Pryor, Fair Basis: A Review of the Recent Cases, 29
INTELL. PROP. FORUM 8 (1997) (criticizing recent Australian cases that apply the fair basis
requirement).
166. See, e.g., CCOM Pty. Ltd. v. Jeijing Pty. Ltd. (1994) 122 A.L.R. 417, 433-34 (Austl.)
(examining the origins in British law of the fair basis requirement). Disconformity was one of
the grounds that supported a writ of scire facias for revocation of a patent.
167. Claims became mandatory in the British patent system under the Patents, Designs, and
Trade Marks Act 1883 (UK).
168. Section 26(3) of the 1883 Act specified that any ground that would have supported a
writ of scire facias could still be alleged as a defense to infringement. CCOM, 122 A.L.R. at
434.
169. The provisional specification concept appeared in section 6 of the Patent Law
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Unfortunately, the notion of disconformity was never articulated
with any great precision. Instead, in Mullard Radio, the leading pre-
1949 enunciation, the court gave the test in terms that did little
beyond restating the question: “[A] claim may be for an article which
is new, which is useful and which has subject-matter, yet it may be
too wide a claim because it extends beyond the subject-matter of the
invention.”170 The court invoked a core “consideration” rationale:
The consideration which the patentee gives to the public
disclosing his inventive idea entitles him in return to protection
for an article which embodies his inventive idea but not for an
article which, while capable of being used to carry his
inventive idea into effect, is described in terms which cover
things quite unrelated to his inventive idea, and which do not
embody it at all.171
The 1949 Act turned away from the generic disconformity
concept, omitting the provision allowing patent revocation “on any
ground on which a patent might have been repealed by scire facias,”
and instead included a revocation provision that specified a
multiplicity of possible grounds of revocation.172 Regarding adequacy
of disclosure, section 32 contained two subsections that bear a fairly
close resemblance to current U.S. law under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph. Section 32(1)(h) included enablement and best mode
requirements:
[A] patent may . . . be revoked by the court on any of the
following grounds . . . : that the complete specification does
not sufficiently and fairly describe the invention and the
method by which it is to be performed, or does not disclose the
best method of performing it which was known to the applicant
Amendment Act 1852 (UK). By 1883, the British Patents Act included an express provision
requiring the complete specification and the provisional specification to be “substantially the
same.” § 9(1), 1883 Act; see also § 6(3), Patents and Designs Act 1907 (UK). See generally
CCOM, 122 A.L.R. at 434.
170. Mullard Radio Valve Co., Ltd. v. Philco Radio & Television Corp., 53 R.P.C. 323,
347 (1936).
171. Id.
172. Patents Act 1949 (U.K.) § 32, text reprinted in C.I.P.A. GUIDE TO THE PATENTS ACT
1166-67 (4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter C.I.P.A. GUIDE].
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for the patent and for which he was entitled to claim
protection.173
Separately, section 32(1)(i) encompassed claim ambiguity, but
also injected a “fair basis” requirement, whereby “a patent may . . .
be revoked by the court [if] any claim of the complete specification is
not fairly based on the matter disclosed in the specification.174 While
some authorities have cautioned against reliance on pre-1949
“disconformity” precedent to explain the statutory fair basis
requirement,175 the precedent undoubtedly formed an important part
of the backdrop for understanding the fair basis requirement. As the
court put it in Olin Matheison:
[The fair basis provision] was introduced into the 1949 Act at
the same time as the removal of the provision, contained in the
previous Act, for revocation “on any ground on which a patent
might have been repealed by scire facias . . . . In other words,
section 32(1) covers the objection discussed at length in the
case of . . . [Mullard v. Philco] that a claim which is a
“covetous” claim, or one in which the claim does not
“equiparate” with the consideration given by the disclosure, is
a bad claim. This requirement [] has always been fundamental
in our patent law, and section 32(1) certainly includes it, but it
is not, of course, limited to it.176
173. Id. § 32(1)(h).
174. Id. § 32(1)(i).
175. The Federal Court of Australia has observed that:
in Mullard the House of Lords had been concerned to find a rationale for
disconformity between the body and claims in a complete specification, in the absence
of express statutory provision. The rationale was found in the concept of the disclosure
as the consideration for the monopoly delimited by the claim. But, in applying Mullard
to . . . express statutory provisions, some caution is needed lest the history swamp the
new text.
CCOM, 122 A.L.R. at 435; see also C.I.P.A. Guide, supra note 137, at 1180.
176. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Biorex Laboratories Ltd., [1970] R.P.C. 157, 181
(1969).
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Although litigants raised the fair basis objection in a number of
cases decided under the 1949 Act, the jurisprudence remains
remarkably thin. Efforts to articulate tests for fair basis add only the
most trivial gloss to Mullard Radio. For example, in Therm-a-Store,
the court merely explained the fair basis analysis as residing in the
principle that “[t]he claims in a patent must not go beyond the
disclosure in the specification.”177 In an early case, In re Mond Nickel
Co.’s Application, the court proposed a three-part inquiry having
similarly conclusory overtones.178
These feeble efforts to craft a doctrine truly independent of
enablement are remarkably reminiscent of modern U.S. written
description law. In fact, commentators have noted the substantial
redundancy of fair basis and enablement. Blanco White, for example,
expressed doubt as to whether the fair basis objection had
independent significance given that “[t]he objection includes, it
would seem, little else that could not be more conveniently and
properly brought under some other head of objection.”179
U.S. written description law and British fair basis law contain
other similarities. For example, courts also developed an “essential
177. Therm-a-Store Ltd. v. Weatherseal Windows Ltd., [1984] F.S.R. 323, 339 (1984).
178. In re Mond Nickel’s Co.’s Application for a Patent, [1956] R.P.C. 189, 194 (1955).
The court specifically designed the inquiry to determine whether a claim in a complete
specification was fairly based on the disclosure given in a provisional specification. According
to the court, one should analyze fair basis by inquiring:
(1) whether the alleged invention as claimed can be said to have been broadly
described in the provisional specification;
(2) Is there anything in the provisional specification which is inconsistent with the
alleged invention as claimed?
(3) Does the claim include as a characteristic of the invention a feature as to which the
provisional specification is wholly silent?
Id. at 189. Applying its threefold inquiry, the court concluded that the claim was fairly based on
the provisional specification. Id. at 195. The Federal Court of Australia recently criticized the
Mond Nickel questions for encouraging an “over meticulous verbal analysis” of the fair basis
issue by tying the issue to a notion of strict consistency between claims and disclosure. CCOM,
122 A.L.R. at 436.
179. T.A. BLANCO WHITE, PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 78 n.52 (4th ed. 1974). Indeed,
Blanco White argued that considerable redundancy existed between notions of “wide claiming”
and a whole variety of other traditional validity objections, including obviousness, eligibility,
and utility. Id. at 79 n. 54.
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elements” gloss for the fair basis analysis.180 In C. Van der Lely, the
court tied the analysis to essential claim elements as follows:
in order to find that a claim is fairly based on the disclosures in
the specification, one has at least to find that that invention for
which monopoly is claimed is disclosed as an invention in the
specification. The inventor is, in fairness to the public, entitled
only to monopolise that which, fairly read, he has disclosed as
his invention . . . . What one is led to expect in each case is that
. . . the specification will disclose with sufficient precision all
the essential integers of that invention and the principles upon
which it works.181
Interestingly, courts also appeared to assume plenary authority
over the fair basis question. Courts have adamantly stated that the
reference to “fair” in “fair basis” does not require a factual analysis of
the fairness or unfairness of the patentee’s conduct in prosecution.182
Instead, courts have characterized fair basis as a question of
“construction” of the specification.183 This has made fair basis a
matter for the court, as the court’s observations in Insituform
indicate:
Whether or not a claim is fairly based is a matter of
construction of the claim and the complete specification. This
has to be carried out by the court through the eyes of the
skilled reader. In so doing, the court can be instructed on
technical matters and the background, but thereafter evidence
180. This has particular significance given the move to an “essential element” formulation
in Gentry Gallery and progeny. See generally supra Part II.B..
181. C. Van der Lely v. Ruston’s Engineering Co., [ 1985] R.P.C. 461, 474 (1985).
182. See, e.g., id. at 506; Stauffer Chemical Co.’s Application, [1977] R.P.C. 33, 60
(1976); American Cyanamid Co.’s (Dann’s) Patent, [1971] R.P.C. 425, 437 (H.L. 1970). See
also Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha Ltd. v. Dow Chemical Co., [1987] F.S.R. 137, 148-49 (1986)
(citing the foregoing line of cases with approval but noting that they would not necessarily
preclude a broad-ranging inquiry into the circumstances to the extent that this inquiry helped
elucidate what the disclosure disclosed).
183. See, e.g., American Cyanamid Co.’s (Dann’s) Patent, [1971] R.P.C. 425, 437 (H.L.
1970). At least one court adopted a problem/solution approach to this question of construction:
“In seeking an answer to the [fair basis] question one must first construe the specification itself
to discover the nature of the invention and, where stated, the problem with which the invention
is intended to deal.” C. Van der Lely v. Ruston’s Engineering, R.P.C. at 506.
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is of little assistance.
In the present case, the specification can be understood
without the need for explanation from the witnesses and,
therefore, the decision as to whether the claim is fairly based
must be essentially for the court and not the witnesses.184
This approach shares much in common with that of Judge Lourie,
who dissented recently in Suntiger.185
2. “Fair Basis” in Modern British Patent Law
The role of the fair basis requirement in modern British patent law
remains a matter of considerable complexity. The 1977 Act
significantly reformulated the grounds for revoking a patent for
inadequate disclosure. Eliminating the multiplicity of grounds set
forth in sections 32(1)(h) and (i) of the 1949 Act, the 1977 Act
instead articulated a generic insufficiency requirement: “[a patent
may be revoked if] the specification of the patent does not disclose
the invention clearly enough and completely enough for it to be
performed by a person skilled in the art.”186 It seems clear that this
language carries forward the insufficiency (enablement) standard
from the 1949 Act and eliminates the “best method” requirement.187
184. Insituform Technical Services Ltd. v. Inliner UK, [1992] R.P.C. 83, 95 (Pat. Ct.
1991). Judge Aldous subsequently put a finer point on his Insituform analysis:
In the Insituform case, I sought to apply those principles by ascertaining the teaching
of the specification through the eyes of the skilled man and then deciding whether the
specification provided a fair ground or base for the monopoly claimed. In deciding
whether a fair base was provided, I took into account that the inventive concept could
go wider than the specific embodiment described in the specification. What the
inventive concept is, as Oliver L.J. said [in Van der Lely’s], is a question of purposive
construction, but that does not mean that factual matters have to be disregarded. The
specification must be read through the eyes of the skilled man and, therefore, the court
must adopt his mantle when reading the specification. The court can then decide what
the specification explicitly teaches and what the skilled man would understand was
implicit and thus be within the natural extension of its teaching.
Rediffusion Simulation Ltd. v. Link-Miles Ltd. [1993] F.S.R. 369, 393 (1992).
185. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
186. Patents Act 1977 (U.K.) § 72(1)(c).
187. See, e.g., Helitune Ltd. v. Stewart Hughes Ltd., [1991] F.S.R. 171, 201 (1990) (noting
section 72(1)(c) of the 1977 Act carries forward the 1949 Act section 32(1)(h) notion of
insufficiency notwithstanding slight differences in wording; “guidance as to what will be
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The fate of the fair basis requirement, however, seems less clear
from the language of section 72(1)(c). Some courts and
commentators, noting the excision of the specific “fairly based”
language from the new provision, understandably assumed that the
fair basis requirement had disappeared as a ground of revocation.188
This assumption drew additional force from the language of section
14 of the 1977 Act. Section 14, which sets forth the adequacy of
disclosure requirements for pending applications, includes language
nearly identical to the section 72(1)(c) insufficiency requirement.189
However, section 14 also includes a separate requirement that the
claims be “supported” by the description.190 Therefore, the fair basis
requirement, to the extent that it survived the 1977 Act, served only
as a ground for rejecting a pending application under a “lack of
support” rubric of section 14(5)(c).191 Consequently, litigants could
not raise a fair basis challenge to a granted patent. This, of course,
conforms with the current European practice.192 Nevertheless, some
judges and commentators have expressed frustration with the
discontinuity between pre-grant and post-grant adequacy of
disclosure requirements.193
sufficient in the old cases is apposite.”). See also C.I.P.A. GUIDE, supra note 137, at 612
(§ 71.22).
188. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc.’s Patent, [1989] R.P.C. 147 (Ct. App. 1988) (opining that
post-grant objections styled as “ambiguity” or “lack of fair basis,” which were valid under
former § 32(i), are no longer valid post-grant under the 1977 Act); Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s
Application, [1991] R.P.C. 485, 510 (Ct. App. 1990) (indicating that the fair basis requirement
has disappeared from British patent law), rev’d on other grounds, [1991] R.P.C. 485 (H.L.
1991); DAVID YOUNG ET AL., TERRELL ON THE LAW OF PATENTS § 5.04 (14th Ed. 1994).
189. Patents Act 1977 § 14(3) (U.K.) (stating that “[t]he specification of an application
shall disclose the invention in a manner which is clear enough and complete enough for the
invention to be performed by a person skilled in the art.”).
190. In particular, section 14(5) requires that the claims shall “(a) define the matter for
which the applicant seeks protection; (b) be clear and concise; [and] (c) be supported by the
description. . . .” Id. § 14(5)(c).
191. See, e.g., Glatt’s Application, [1983] R.P.C. 122, 125 (1982) (recognizing the
similarity between section 14(5)(c) and the fair basis doctrine).
192. See supra Part III.A. See also C.I.P.A. GUIDE, supra note 137, at 185 (noting that
section 14(5)(c)’s support requirement remains analogous to that of EPC Article 84).
193. See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Organon Teknika Ltd. (No. 11), [1995] F.S.R. 589 (Ct. App.
1994):
In the 1977 Act, Parliament has carefully adopted the distinction under the Convention
between what may be a ground for rejecting a specification, or curtailing a
specification, in the Patent Office before grant, and what is to be permissible as a
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Against this backdrop, in a remarkable feat of statutory
construction, the House of Lords resuscitated the fair basis
requirement in Biogen, Inc. v. Medeva, Inc.,194 a landmark decision
on biotechnology patenting.195 Although Lord Hoffman’s opinion in
Biogen addresses inventive step and enablement, its treatment of fair
basis is most pertinent in the fair basis context. Lord Hoffman
acknowledged that the fair basis requirement had disappeared from
the face of the statute, but nevertheless insisted that the fair basis
“principle” remained:
[T]he disappearance of ‘lack of fair basis’ as an express ground
for revocation does not in my view mean that general principle
which it expressed has been abandoned. The jurisprudence of
the EPO shows that it is still in full vigor and embodied in
articles 83 and 84 of the EPC, of which equivalents in the 1977
Act are section 14(3) and (5) and section 72(1)(c).196
In Lord Hoffman’s view, the general principle is that the claim must
remain confined to the extent of the technical contribution as
described in the patent.197
Although the statutory construction that carries the fair basis
“principle” forward into section 72(1)(c) may not provide
illumination for those in the United States, other aspects of the
ground for revocation of a patent after grant.
It is mere speculation for us to endeavour to guess at what the reason for that change
was.
Id. See also Kern, supra note 138, at 281 (referring to an initiative on the part of the United
Kingdom’s Chartered Institute of Patent Agents to amend the EPC to make article 84’s lack of
support a ground for revocation); Roberts, supra note 139, at 373.
194. [1997] R.P.C. 1 (1996). The claims concerned recombinant DNA technology that
induced the production of antigens to the hepatitis-B virus. Id. at 40-41.
195. The decision has generated an impressive range of commentary, generally favorable.
See Kern, supra note 138; Anthony McInerney, Biotechnology: Biogen v. Medeva in the House
of Lords, 20 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 14 (1998); Catherine Colston, Genetic Engineering—
Failure to Invent? The House of Lords’ Decision in Biogen Inc. v. Medeva PLC, 4 INTELL.
PROP. Q. 521 (1997); Ian Karet, Delivering the Goods, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 21 (1997);
Amanda Warren, Discrimination by Redefinition: The Judicial Approach to Patenting
Biotechnology in the United Kingdom, 1997 J. BUS. L. 575 (1997).
196. Biogen, [1997] R.P.C. at 54.
197. Id.
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opinion bear consideration.198 First, the fact that Lord Hoffman felt
compelled to reach beyond enablement to a “support” rationale is
significant; his opinion contains parallels to the written description
requirement in the United States. Second, notwithstanding Lord
Hoffman’s careful elucidation of the relationship between the
relevant provisions on sufficiency and support (both in the priority
context and as grounds for revocation), the Biogen standard for
“support” does not meaningfully confine judges’ discretion to strike
down claims for inadequate disclosure. Criticizing the lower courts
and the EPO for inquiring whether the disclosure could “deliver the
goods across the full width of the patent or priority document,” Lord
Hoffman set out a vivid governing rubric that has the fluidity of the
“possession” standard. Lord Hoffman stated, “it is not whether the
claimed invention could deliver the goods, but whether the claims
cover other ways in which they might be delivered: ways which owe
nothing to the teaching of the patent or any principle which it
disclosed.”199 Lord Hoffman proceeded to outline two ways in which
the breadth of a claimed invention might exceed the technical
contribution in the disclosure; yet he framed both possibilities in the
rhetoric of enablement.200
Thus, even this relatively brief excursion through Biogen seems to
confirm observations from U.S. written description law as to both the
nature and likely costs of disclosure doctrines that supplement
enablement, be they called “support,” “fair basis,” or something else.
Certainly, the support/fair basis notion, as articulated in Biogen,
appears to leave judges with wide discretion to strike down claims for
198. Lord Hoffman saw distinctions between the “statutory language” and the “substantive
effect” of that language:
Section 72(1) states exhaustively the grounds upon which a patent may be revoked.
These grounds do not, as such, include noncompliance with section 14(5). But the
substantive effect of section 14(5)(c) . . . is given effect by section 72(1)(c). There is
accordingly no gap or illogicality in the scheme of the Act.
Id. at 47.
199. Id. at 50.
200 First, claims might be drawn to a genus but disclose only a species of the genus, such
that the patent claims “results that it does not enable.” Id. at 51.  Second, a patent “may claim
every way of achieving that result which make no use of the invention.” Biogen, [1997] R.P.C.
at 51  (citing, inter alia, O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854) as exemplifying the
second scenario).
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insufficient supporting disclosure. Presumably, this remains true even
if contestants have not proven a violation.201 Although this discretion
may often be deployed wisely by experienced jurists, like Lord
Hoffman, the Biogen standard indeed confers vast discretion.
IV.
Only a few years after the arrival of the written description
requirement in U.S. law, Judge Markey recognized its character:
How incongruous. How exaltive of form over substance. How
illustrative of stare decisis rampant. The board is saying that it
doesn’t matter that one discloses an invention in such “clear,
concise and exact terms” (enablement) as to enable its practice,
the very purpose and quid pro quo of the patent system from its
inception.202
Judge Markey had it right. The written description requirement is at
worst indecipherable, and at best unruly, even when considered in
isolation. Viewed together with other disclosure doctrines under U.S.
law (e.g., enablement, best mode, utility), the entire exercise of
making patent disclosure law very much resembles the proverbial
herding of cats, both in its level of cacophony and its likely futility.
Comparative analysis reinforces this proposition: written description
analogs such as “support” in European patent law and “fair basis” in
British patent law seem as indeterminate as the written description
requirement. This result occurs despite the best efforts of leading
jurists.
Today, however, after repeated (and more aggressive) Federal
Circuit invocations of the written description requirement, the weight
of stare decisis hangs even heavier. Moreover, comparative study
suggests that the written description requirement or analogous
doctrines simply may be part of the realpolitik of patent disclosure
law. Accordingly, it may be overly optimistic to propose that the
Federal Circuit dispose of the written description requirement
201. Lord Hoffman, however, would apparently have found enablement (“sufficiency”)
lacking in any event based on the facts before him. Id. at 53.
202. Barker, 559 F.2d at 594 (Markey, J., dissenting).
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altogether with one bold stroke, or alternatively that Congress address
the matter. This does not mean, however, that we ought to resign
ourselves to the status quo regarding the written description
requirement. Reconsideration of the doctrine with adjustments is
possible.
As a first step, the Federal Circuit might simply admit that the
written description requirement is redundant of enablement. This
would at least allow for a more forthright exploration of the question
whether redundancy in patent disclosure requirement remains
tolerable.203 The Federal Circuit could reach the conclusion, perhaps,
that the written description requirement simply provides a fail-safe
mechanism that judges (or examiners) may use in their discretion in
hard cases. Presumably, these are cases where litigants file claims
long after filing a disclosure and cases where the existence of
conception remains in question due to the nature of the technology.
This conclusion would eliminate the need for continued efforts to
fabricate a separate standard for written description, whether under
the Gentry Gallery “essential element” rubric, the “possession” test,
or some other similarly ethereal standard.
This approach would yield a more honest jurisprudence, but not a
better one. For the reasons expressed in this Article, this level of
judicial discretion is too costly, and it would be unfortunate if reform
efforts only to make plain the vast scope of judicial discretion under
the written description requirement. Instead, courts should resist the
narcotic of the written description requirement and redirect their
energies towards refining the enablement concept, particularly as it
correlates to claim scope.204 Under such a regime courts might, for
example, reconsider the simplistic distinction between predictable
and unpredictable arts. In doing so courts could confront questions
about the scope of enabling disclosures for claims in the mechanical
arts. Additionally, courts should carefully consider whether the patent
203. One need not view redundancy as intolerable per se. See Randy E. Barnett, The
Virtues of Redundancy in Legal Thought, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 153, 155 (1990).
204. Judge Markey advocated a similar solution when he stated, “[w]e should not hesitate
to recognize that it would have been better if the court had held, in certain past chemical cases,
that whatever “enablement” was present, it was not in “full, clear, concise and exact terms,”
rather than to have created a “separate description” gloss.” Barker, 559 F.2d at 595 (Markey, J.,
dissenting).
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applicant satisfies the enablement disclosure requirement throughout
the scope of the claim.
One could imagine a regime that would feature the gradual
emergence of a reinvigorated enablement requirement as the
dominant disclosure principle. Under this regime, reliance on the
written description requirement would become so rare that the written
description requirement could finally be discarded. Understandably,
this would not instantaneously transform adequacy of disclosure into
an easy concept for any patent system. It might, however, cause the
patent disclosure jurisprudence to look more like an exercise in
developing coherent guidelines, and less like the herding of cats.
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